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Abstract
This paper contrasts the investment behavior of di↵erent financial institu-
tions in debt securities as a response to price changes. For identification, I use
unique security-level data from the German Microdatabase Securities Hold-
ings Statistics. Banks and investment funds respond in a pro-cyclical manner
to price changes. In contrast, insurance companies and pension funds act
counter-cyclically; they buy after price declines and sell after price increases.
The heterogeneous responses can be explained by di↵erences in their balance
sheet structure. I exploit within-sector variation in the financial constraint to
show that tighter constraints are associated with relatively more pro-cyclical
investment behavior.
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1 Introduction
Do all institutional investors exhibit similar investment behavior? Which institutions act
as stabilizers and which act as amplifiers of shocks? What drives di↵erences in behavior
across financial institutions? To answer these questions, I explore a unique security-by-
security holdings dataset provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank.
I present evidence that banks and investment funds respond pro-cyclically to price
changes, i.e. they buy securities whose prices are rising and sell them when prices are
falling. In contrast, insurance companies and pension funds are counter-cyclical investors,
i.e. they buy when prices are falling and sell when prices are rising. In the baseline
specification, I regress the percentage change in nominal holdings of the debt security
of each sector on the lagged percentage price change of these securities, controlling for
observed and unobserved time-invariant security characteristics as well as unobserved and
observed time-specific factors. I find that a 10 percent price decrease in the last quarter
is associated with a 1.4 percent and 3.6 percent reduction in the nominal amount held by
investment funds and banks, respectively. In contrast, insurance companies and pension
funds increase their nominal amount held by 4.3 percent when the price of a security
dropped by 10 percent in the previous quarter.
This behavior may be attributed to di↵erences in the fragility of the balance sheet
structure of these sectors. This can be confirmed by exploiting within-sector variation
in the balance sheet constraints. First, the pro-cyclical investment behavior is stronger
for banks that are relatively less capitalized. Second, investment funds that face more
outflows act more pro-cyclically relative to other investment funds. Third, the counter-
cyclical investment behavior of insurance companies and pension funds is weaker when
their negative duration gap rises.
I also present evidence that banks’ and investment funds’ balance sheet constraints
tighten when they su↵er losses on their security holdings. While losses on the security
holdings of investment funds lead to outflows, banks’ capital constraints tighten when
they su↵er losses on their security holdings. Since banks and investment funds are averse
to tightening constraints and price changes exhibit a short-term momentum factor, pro-
cyclical investment behavior can be rational. In contrast, the liability side of insurance
companies and pension funds is relatively more stable and movements in their balance
sheets are relatively orthogonal to economic and financial conditions. This makes in-
surance companies and pension funds more capable of absorbing losses on a short-term
horizon and enables them to act in a counter-cyclical fashion.
The pro-cyclical investment behavior of investment funds and banks resulted in rel-
atively mild losses on their security holdings during the European sovereign debt crisis.
Although insurance companies and pension funds su↵ered severe losses on their security
holdings during the sovereign debt crisis, they outperformed banks and investment funds
in the medium term. More generally, while bond prices fall at short horizons after insur-
ance companies and pension funds have bought them, they revert after several quarters,
leading to larger capital gains in the medium run. In contrast, bond prices rise at short
horizons after banks and investment funds have acquired them but fall in the medium
run.
In order to shed light on these questions, security-level data is indispensable. In this pa-
per I use unique, confidential security-by-security holdings data provided by the Deutsche
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Bundesbank (the German central bank) covering the period from 2005 Q4 through 2014
Q4. This study is the first that uses security-level data of the German Microdatabase
Security Holdings statistics for bank and non-bank financial institutions and their invest-
ment behavior in debt securities.1 The holdings include both foreign and domestic as well
as government and corporate securities. I contrast the buying behavior of the three largest
groups of institutional investors: banks; investment funds; and insurance companies and
pension funds. By examining the three sectors jointly, I can investigate the investment
behavior of banks, investment funds and insurance companies and pension funds in the
same security at a given point in time.
Theory yields a variety of predictions about the buying behavior of capital market
participants. The standard e cient market hypothesis claims that asset prices must reflect
all available information due to the existence of arbitrageurs (Fama, 1965; Friedman,
1953). While banks may be forced to sell undervalued assets due to margin calls, non-
levered institutional investors may stabilize the market by buying up fire-sold assets in
order to benefit from future price gains (Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). In contrast, it might
also be rational to speculate on price increases so that prices can be pushed away from
fundamentals (DeLong et al., 1990b; Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2003). However, despite
its importance for macro-prudential policy and financial stability, empirical evidence on
who is buying and selling as a response to price changes has been elusive due to a lack of
granular data.
One contribution of this paper is to identify insurance companies and pension funds
as counter-cyclical investors who “lean against the wind” by buying securities when prices
are falling and selling them when prices are rising.2 Due to the market clearing condition,
for every pro-cyclical investor there needs to be a counter-cyclical investor who takes the
other side of the trade. Said di↵erently, for every buyer there needs to be a seller, and
vice versa. Although the theoretical literature predicts rational arbitrageurs with “deep
pockets” to behave counter-cyclically, empirical studies have failed to identify them.
The closest paper to this one is Abbassi et al. (2016), which shows that banks with
trading expertise increased their holdings of debt securities with falling prices during the
crisis relatively more than banks without trading expertise. In contrast to their paper,
I distinguish the investment behavior of the entire banking sector to non-bank financial
institutions, i.e. the investment fund industry and the insurance company and pension
fund sector.
In addition, their analysis only sheds light on the relative investment behavior of
trading banks versus non-trading banks, but remains silent about whether these institu-
tions actually buy when prices fall. In contrast to Abbassi et al. (2016), I show not only
whether certain sectors act relatively more counter-cyclically than do others, but also that
insurance companies and pension funds actually buy securities when prices fall and sell
securities when prices rise. In addition, instead of concentrating only on times of stress,
I aim to generalize the cyclical investment behavior across time periods, verifying that it
is robust during the crisis. While periods of high stress are certainly crucial for financial
stability, normal periods are also important to consider as these are times when systemic
1Abbassi et al. (2016) and Buch et al. (2016) focus on banks’ investment behavior in debt securities.
Domanski et al. (2017) use aggregate data for German insurance companies and pension funds.
2I am not the first who uses the term in this context. Weill (2007) shows theoretically that market
makers are “leaning against the wind” by providing liquidity in times of market stress.
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risk builds up.
Security holdings of banks have received much attention recently.3 However, there is
little evidence on their trading behavior at the micro-level due to a lack of security-level
holdings data. Micro-level evidence is crucial due to the heterogeneity in price dynamics
of bonds depending on their security-level characteristics, such as the country and sector
of issue, the maturity, or the credit rating.4 In addition to showing that the banking
sector as a whole acts pro-cyclically, I also exploit cross-sectional variation and show that
the pro-cyclical behavior is stronger for banks that are relatively less capitalized. These
results are consistent with models of limits to arbitrage due to capital constraints (Gromb
and Vayanos, 2002; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). However, it is at odds with Hanson et al.
(2015) who model banks as patient fixed-income investors.
This paper also contributes to the investment fund literature. Fund managers may act
with a short-term horizon due to agency frictions as they are exposed to injections and
redemptions from investors (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Morris and Shin, 2015; Chen
et al., 2010; Goldstein et al., 2015). While most papers focus on the relationship between
performance and inflows, I investigate the investment behavior of investment funds. Many
investment funds are measured on monthly or quarterly performance, which adds pressure
to chase the market higher as it moves. Since fund managers may not be able to coordinate
their selling behavior and have an incentive to time the market, it may be rational for them
to trade pro-cyclically (Abreu and Brunnermeier, 2003). Consistent with this prediction, I
provide empirical evidence that investment funds respond pro-cyclically to price changes.
I also show that investment funds that face more outflows act relatively more pro-cyclically
relative to other investment funds. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) similarly show that
hedge funds that were not riding the tech bubble underperformed and su↵ered significant
investor redemptions. My findings are also in line with the findings of Feroli et al. (2014)
who show that a feedback loop between prices and sales of investment funds managers can
emerge.5 Since the pro-cyclicality seems to be existent in both upswings and downturns,
delegated portfolio managers may generally increase market volatility and distort asset
prices (Guerrieri and Kondor, 2012).
In contrast to the pro-cyclical investment behavior of banks and investment funds, I
find that insurance companies and pension funds act counter-cyclically with respect to
price changes. While this is consistent with the view that long-term investors should
stabilize the market by acting in a contrarian way, this has not been shown empirically.6
Most studies even point to pro-cyclical behavior of insurance companies and pension
funds. The reason for that may be that most studies focus on how credit ratings a↵ect
the investment behavior of investment funds, and failing to specifically ask the question of
3See e.g. Acharya et al. (2014), Acharya and Ste↵en (2015), Battistini et al. (2014), Gennaioli et al.
(2014) and references therein.
4Again, a notable exception that uses security-level holdings data is Abbassi et al. (2016). While
they do not show how the whole banking sector responds to price changes, my findings show that banks
generally respond pro-cyclically to price changes.
5In addition, Shek et al. (2015) show that investment funds sell more when they face outflows. Raddatz
and Schmukler (2012) also show that mutual funds’ investment behavior tends to be pro-cyclical and thus
not stabilizing; they reduce their exposure to countries in bad times and increase it during good times.
6My findings are consistent with an asset insulator model like in Chodorow-Reich et al. (2016). They
show that usually stock prices of insurance companies do not drop when they su↵er losses on their security
holdings.
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whether they actually act pro or counter-cyclically (Ellul et al., 2011, 2015; Merrill et al.,
2012). Becker and Ivashina (2015) who explain that insurance companies buy corporate
bonds that are the highest yielding within each rating group as they are reluctant to
hold more capital when they hold worse-rated bonds.7 While my results hold in the
pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis period, I find that counter-cyclical investment behavior is
weaker in times when insurance companies’ and pension funds’ negative duration gap gets
larger. This suggests that a low interest rate environment may weaken the counter-cyclical
behavior as it can result in larger duration gaps for insurance companies and pension
funds. In addition, I present evidence that insurance companies and pension funds buy
bonds whose excess bond yields rise. This supports the hypothesis that they are buy-
and-hold investors and not averse to liquidity risk. In general, my results suggest that the
investment behavior of insurance companies and pension funds can be a stabilizing force
on the capital markets.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I describe the data. Section 3 presents
the main empirical findings on the heterogeneous investment responses of financial institu-
tions to price changes. Section 4 shows that a balance sheet channel is at work by showing
heterogeneous responses within each sector dependent on the institutions’ balance sheet
constraints. Section 5 discusses the dynamics of price changes. In section 6, I conduct
additional robustness tests. Section 7 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Data Description
The Microdatabase Securities Holding Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s Research
Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank provides quarterly security-by-
security-level holdings data of all investors based in Germany from 2005 Q4 onwards. The
data includes the raw, nominal and market value of each security. The institutions report
the raw value of the security holdings to the Deutsche Bundesbank, which subsequently
calculates the nominal and market value. The raw value is the nominal value held in the
currency of denomination. The nominal value is the notional amount of security holdings
and does not reflect price movements. The market value is the number of securities held
multiplied by the price.8 The price that is used to calculate the market value of the
security is gathered from the Centralised Securities Database (CSDB) and reflects the
market price of the security at the end of the quarter. I use this price for the rest of my
analysis.  Price is calculated by taking the di↵erence of the log of the price.
The security is identified with the International Security Identification Number (ISIN).
Information about the currency of denomination, the security classification and the issuing
sector of the security is also available. The holdings are further split up by the sector
that is holding the security. The largest holding sectors are banks, investment funds
and insurance companies and pension funds, followed by non-financial corporates and
households. While this dataset contains information about the sector that is holding the
security, it does not specify which institution within the sector is holding it.
7Other studies that indicate that insurance companies and pension funds act pro-cyclically are Acharya
and Morales (2015); Domanski et al. (2017); Duijm and Steins Bisschop (2015); Haldane (2014)
8The nominal value needs to be adjusted to reflect only investment decisions (see Appendix).
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However, I also use the institution-level security-level holdings data and balance sheet
information for all banks in Germany for the same time period from the Microdatabase
Securities Holding Statistics and the monthly bank balance sheet statistics, respectively.
For investment funds, I use institution-level security-holdings data and balance sheet
data from the investment fund statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank. However, the
institution-level security-holdings data is only available from the end of 2009. For in-
surance companies and pension funds the institution-level security-holdings data is not
available. For a detailed data description of the Microdatabase Securities Holding Statistic
see Amann et al. (2012) and Bade et al. (2016).
In order to harmonize the analysis for all three sectors, I use sector-level data for my
main analysis. In addition, I only consider the three largest sectors: banks; investment
funds; and insurance companies and pension funds. I also restrict my analysis to debt
securities and discard any equity security holdings.
I download additional security-specific characteristics from Bloomberg and Datas-
tream. The yield refers to the yield-to-maturity. The credit rating is the S&P rating
if available and the Fitch rating otherwise. Investment grade rating is defined as a rat-
ing better than BB+. For parts of the analysis, the data provided by the Deutsche
Bundesbank is merged with publicly available data. The country-specific 10-year generic
government bond yield, the consumer price index and GDP are from the IMF. I obtain
GDP growth and the inflation rate by taking the natural log change of GDP and the
consumer price index. If GDP is not available quarterly, I interpolate the annual value
linearly. The VIX is the log of the implied volatility for S&P 500 stock options and is ob-
tained from the Chicago Board Options Exchange and downloaded through Datastream.
The EONIA is from the ECB. The country-specific variables are merged with the first two
characters of the ISIN code. This is consistent with the nationality and not the residence
principle and accounts for o↵shore issuance of securities.
2.2 Summary Statistics and Stylized Facts
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the main variables. The average value of a security
held is 22.6 million Euros for insurance companies and pension funds, 31.8 million Euros
for investment funds and 57.6 million for banks. Insurance companies and pension funds,
which hold a significantly smaller quantity of securities, are the smallest group of debt
security holders among the three sectors. Insurance companies and pension funds not
only hold fewer securities, but they also trade less. However, when they do trade, they
transact larger volumes than do investment funds. Investment funds are the most active
traders among the three; the number of observations for buy and sell outstrip those for
banks and insurance companies and pension funds. On average, the amounts they trade
are smaller than those of banks and insurance companies and pension funds. This is also
true for the percentage changes in their holdings. When investment funds trade, they
increase their holdings on average by 22 percent and reduce their holdings on average by
21 percent. The numbers for banks and insurance companies and pension funds are larger.
Banks increase their holdings on average by 37 percent and reduce their holdings by 41
percent. Insurance companies and pension funds change their holdings on average by 31
percent. The standard deviation of the netbuy variable also suggests that investment
funds transact smaller amounts than do banks and insurance companies and pension
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funds. The standard deviation is 43 percent for for investment funds compared to 67
percent for insurance companies and pension funds and 81 percent for banks. Lastly,
while the average price change is close to zero, the standard deviation of the price change
is 4 percent.
Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the holdings of debt securities of the three
sectors over time. Banks are the largest holder of debt securities, followed by investment
funds and insurance companies and pension funds. While banks increased their security
holdings before the beginning of the financial crisis, they have since reduced their security
holdings significantly (Figure 1). In contrast, non-bank financial institutions such as
investment funds and insurance companies gained more importance in the provision of
market-based funding. Although investment funds built up their security holdings over
time they were selling securities during the sovereign debt crisis (Figure 2). In contrast,
insurance companies and pension funds were building up debt securities even between
2010 and 2012 (Figure 3).9
The active selling behavior of banks and investment funds in the crisis paid o↵ in
the short run, as can be seen from Figure 4. The capital gains on their debt security
portfolios were positive before dropping into negative territory in mid-2010, but still
without major losses. Insurance companies and pension funds, however, su↵ered severely
when their bonds fell in value during the crisis, but their medium-term strategy paid o↵
when prices began to recover. Between mid-2011 and the end of 2014 capital gains on
their debt securities have been nearly 30 percent. They have outperformed banks and
investment funds not only since mid-2010, but also since the beginning of the financial
crisis. While insurance companies and pension funds kept buying securities during the
crisis, temporarily su↵ering losses, they outperformed the other two sectors in the medium
run. This is in line with the statement by Matteo Renzi, at that time Italy’s prime
minister, to the Italian Senate on February 17, 2016:
“Let me say that if some northern European lenders had kept their Italian
government debt in 2011-2012, they would be earning much more.”
However, holding or even increasing the holdings of securities that have performed
poorly can be a risky strategy as bond prices tend to continue their trend for several
quarters before price trends reverse (Cutler et al., 1991, 1990; Moskowitz et al., 2012).
Although the selling behavior that Matteo Renzi stresses has been formally rationalized
by DeLong et al. (1990b), not every investor can take the same side of a trade. Due to the
adding-up constraint, someone has to buy the securities when their prices fall and others
are selling them.10 The above results suggest that insurance companies and pension funds
have been the institutions that tried to “catch the falling knife”. However, these stylized
facts only show simple aggregated numbers that can be influenced by other factors. In
the next section I turn to a security-by-security analysis to test the systematic investment
behavior of the di↵erent sectors more formally.
9For the portfolio composition of the three sectors see Table A1.
10DeLong et al. (1990b) call them “passive investors”.
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3 Main Results
I attempt to shed light on the question of which institutions act pro-cyclically or counter-
cyclically by investigating how their investment decisions depend on price changes. My
regression is in the spirit of Abbassi et al. (2016), but instead of comparing trading
banks to non-trading banks, I compare insurance companies and pension funds to banks
and investment funds. I treat insurance companies and pension funds as my benchmark
and define a dummy Banks that equals one for banks and zero otherwise. The second
dummy Funds takes a value of one for investment funds and zero otherwise. I regress the
percentage increase in the nominal amount held by each institution on the interaction
of the respective dummies with the price changes. The coe cients on the interaction
terms show how much more pro-cyclically banks and investment funds act compared to
insurance companies and pension funds. I estimate the following specification:
Netbuyi,s,t =  1 Prices,t 1⇤Fundsi+ 2 Prices,t 1⇤Banksi+↵s,t+↵i,t+↵i,s+✏i,s,t (1)
The results are shown in column (6) of Table 2. Netbuy is the change in the log of
the nominal amount held of security s at quarter t given the institution trades.11  Price
is the change of the log price of the security.12 The price change at time t reflects the
change in the price from the end of quarter t 1 until the end of quarter t. I lag  Price by
one quarter in order prevent contamination of my results by the possibility that trading
decisions have a price impact.13 In addition, this allows me to rule out the possibility
that trading decisions are executed before the institution observes the reported price.14
In this specification I also include security⇤time, sector⇤time and security⇤sector fixed
e↵ects. The inclusion of security⇤time fixed e↵ects controls for all time-variant and time-
invariant security-specific characteristics so that a separate security fixed e↵ect is spanned
by the security⇤time fixed e↵ect. This specification allows me to draw conclusions about
the investment behavior in one specific security at a given point in time. For instance,
A positive correlation between the error term and the change in the price leads to an
overestimation of the price change coe cient. Comparing banks and investment funds to
insurance companies and pension funds allows me to control for unobserved and observed
time-varying security characteristics. The additional inclusion of sector⇤time fixed e↵ects
controls for time-variant and time-invariant sector-specific characteristics. By controlling
for sector⇤time fixed e↵ects, I can confirm that results hold if I control for the amount
11The netbuy measure reflects only buy and sell decisions and no valuation e↵ects. The results are
robust to the use of other netbuy measures. For instance, the results do not change qualitatively whether
I use the log of the amount bought minus the log of the amount sold or the amount in Euros. The results
are also robust when I use buy and sell separately instead of using a netbuy measure. The results are
also robust when hold decisions are included.
12The results are robust to the inclusion of higher lags of the price change as well as price changes of
a lower frequency.
13In this case the change in the price and the decision to buy or sell may be jointly determined.
14If I included the contemporaneous price change, trading decision could have been executed any time
during the quarter t, although the price change I am using in my regression has not been observed as it
is the price change from the end of quarter t  1 until the end of quarter t. Therefore, unless the trading
decision is always executed at the last point of the quarter, the contemporaneous independent variables
may be observed only after the decision to transact is taken.
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invested by the specific sector at a given time. Lastly, I saturate the specification with
security⇤sector fixed e↵ects to control for observed and unobserved preference of the three
sectors for specific securities.
Column (6) shows that both banks and investment funds invest more pro-cyclically in
response to price changes than do insurance companies and pension funds (Table 2). A
10 percent price increase of a security is associated with a 8.6 percentage point stronger
increase by banks and a 4.3 percentage point stronger increase of the nominal position by
investment funds relative to insurance companies and pension funds. As can already be
seen from the interpretation of the results, the disadvantage of including security⇤time
fixed e↵ects is that I can only make statements about whether the sectors trade more or
less pro or counter-cyclically to price changes relative to insurance companies and pension
funds and not whether they actually buy or sell.
Columns (1)-(3) exclude the security⇤time fixed e↵ects. Excluding security⇤time from
the specification relaxes the restrictions that at least two sectors need to trade the se-
curity at a given point in time. The exclusion of the security⇤time fixed e↵ect implies
that the level of the price change is identified as it is no longer collinear with the fixed
e↵ects. The interpretation of the level of the price change coe cient is the response of
insurance companies and pension funds to price changes. Column (3) of Table 2 shows
that a 10 percent increase in the price is associated with a 4.3 percent decrease of the
nominal amount held by insurance companies and pension funds. The interaction of the
price change with the dummy Funds shows that investment funds increase their nomi-
nal holdings by 5.7 percentage points percentage more, i.e. they increase their holdings
by 1.4 percent. The interaction of the price change with the dummy Banks shows that
banks increase their holdings by 7.9 percentage points more than insurance companies
and pension funds, i.e. they increase their holdings by 3.6 percent. Column (2) and (3)
are equivalent to splitting the sample and estimating the equation separately for banks,
investment funds and insurance companies and pension funds. This also allows testing
the null hypothesis whether institutions do not respond to price change against the alter-
native hypothesis that they change their holdings in response to price changes. This is in
contrast to Table 2 where I test whether institutions change their holdings di↵erentially
in response to price changes.
Therefore, the following specification can be estimated:
NetbuyXs,t =  1 Prices,t 1 + ↵s + ↵t + ✏s,t (2)
X represents investment funds, banks or insurance companies and pension funds.
Columns (1) and (2) show the results for when X equals investment funds; columns (2)
and (3) are for insurance companies and pension funds; columns (5) and (6) show the
results for banks. Again, ↵s is a security fixed e↵ect that controls for security-specific
characteristics that are time-invariant. The inclusion of security fixed e↵ects controls for
the fact that di↵erent securities have di↵erent time-invariant characteristics, such as the
expiration date or the coupon. It also enables me to analyze the investment behavior in
a specific security over time, which circumvents the issue that the number of securities
outstanding in the economy can change.15 ↵t is a time fixed e↵ect that controls for market-
wide development. As I split the equation into three parts the security fixed e↵ect as well
15See appendix for details.
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as the time fixed e↵ects are sector-specific. This is equivalent to the sector⇤time and
sector⇤security fixed e↵ect in Table 2.
Table 3 shows the estimation of equation (2) sector by sector. Investment funds and
banks buy securities whose prices have risen and sell securities that have lost value, i.e.
they have an upward sloping demand curve. In contrast, insurance companies and pension
funds buy when prices have fallen and sell when prices have risen. The inclusion of time
fixed e↵ects implies that aggregate time-specific characteristics that a↵ect the investment
behavior are discarded. For instance, when banks sell securities when prices fall, if this is
also the time when their funding dries up or they have to de-lever, this would not capture
pro-cyclical behavior due to the time fixed e↵ects. On the other side, when insurance
companies and pension funds increase their holdings in general in times when prices fall,
this would not be captured in a specification with time fixed e↵ects. Including time fixed
e↵ects might somewhat overcontrol some of the e↵ects. Instead of showing how much
insurance companies and pension funds actually buy when prices fall, it rather shows how
much is bought of securities whose prices decreased relatively more than those of other
securities.
Therefore, Table 3 also shows the results without time fixed e↵ects. The e↵ects are
again statistically and economically highly significant. A two standard deviation increase
in the price (7.4 percent) is associated with 2.52 percent increase in the nominal holdings
for banks, 0.78 percent for investment funds and a 6.29 percent decrease for insurance
companies and pension funds. These magnitudes add up to an increase of 1.45 million
Euros for banks, 0.25 million for investment funds and 1.42 million decrease for insurance
companies and pension funds.16 The counter-cyclical investment behavior of insurance
companies and pension funds o↵sets almost completely the pro-cyclical investment behav-
ior of banks and investment funds, although the security holdings of banks and investment
funds are significantly larger than those of insurance companies and pension funds.
The results above indicate that banks and investment funds act like positive feedback
investors who “buy securities when prices rise and sell when prices fall” (DeLong et al.,
1990b). Since insurance companies and pension funds have “deep pockets” they may
be able to trade against them (DeLong et al., 1990a).17 The investment behavior of
banks and investment funds might be rational for several reasons. In the next section, I
empirically investigate one potential channel that could generate these findings, a balance
sheet channel.
4 Balance Sheet Constraints
4.1 Balance Sheets and Investment Behavior
The pro-cyclical investment behavior of banks and investment funds could be explained
by their unstable balance sheet composition. I test this channel by exploiting cross-
sectional heterogeneity within the banking and investment fund sector. This within-sector
heterogeneity confirms that institutions with tighter constraints act in a more pro-cyclical
16It is important to stress that these numbers are for a single security. Given that the institutions hold
several thousands of securities, the results sum up to even larger aggregate numbers.
17Insurance companies’ and pension funds’ investment behavior is consistent with passive investors in
DeLong et al. (1990b).
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way to price changes. In particular, banks with tighter capital constraints and investment
funds with more outflows act relatively more pro-cyclically. The constraints of banks
and investment funds also tighten when the institutions su↵er losses on their security
holdings. Since price changes exhibit a momentum factor at short horizons and banks
and investment funds are averse to short-term losses, the pro-cyclical investment behavior
of banks and investment funds may be rational.
In contrast, insurance companies and pension funds have long-term liabilities so that
they are not exposed to redemption pressure. While insurance companies and pension
funds act relatively less counter-cyclically in times when their negative duration gap rises,
the duration gap does not seem to be related to losses on their security holdings.18 The
benefit of a more stable balance sheet may explain why insurance companies and pension
funds are acting in a counter-cyclical manner and can benefit from buying securities whose
values have fallen.
Before I empirically link the institution’s balance sheet constraints to their investment
behavior, I lay out the balance sheet structure of the institutions under investigation and
discuss the balance sheet channel hypothesis in greater detail.19
4.1.1 Banks
Figure 5 shows di↵erent categories of the aggregated balance sheet of German banks
proportionally. The total size of the balance sheets amounted to 7.85 trillion Euros in
2014, which is around 270 percent of Germany’s GDP (2.9 trillion Euros in 2014). The
liability side mainly consists of retail and wholesale deposits. Only 382 billion Euros,
approximately 5 percent, are equity capital. Both retail and interbank borrowing are
short-term liabilities that can be withdrawn without an extended period of notice.20
When creditors refuse to roll over their debt or actively withdraw their funds, the
asset side needs to be reduced in order to service the liabilities. The asset side of banks
mainly consists of longer-term assets, such as debt securities and loans. When funding
liquidity dries up, banks start by reducing their most liquid assets, such as cash and excess
reserves at the central bank. As these contribute only a small amount to the aggregate
balance sheet and banks are unable to call in loans, debt securities need to be sold. If
the liquidity dryup is systemic and non-specific to a single bank, banks may have trouble
finding a buyer for the securities, forcing them to sell them below their fundamental value,
what is known as a “fire sale”.
The small amount of equity capital exacerbates their unstable balance sheet structure.
The poorer capitalized a bank is, the more leverage increases when the value of the assets
declines. In order to keep leverage constant, banks need to sell securities which can lead
to a spiral between lower asset prices and weaker balance sheets (Adrian and Shin, 2010,
2014; Brunnermeier, 2009; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Greenwood et al., 2015).21
18Chodorow-Reich et al. (2016) show that stock prices of insurance companies in the US are usually
not sensitive to losses on their security holdings.
19See also Hanson et al. (2015) for a discussion of the balance sheets of various financial intermediaries.
20While in the banking crisis as described in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) retail deposits were with-
drawn, the most recent financial crisis was characterized by a withdrawal of wholesale funding and money
market fund shares.
21This is not only the case for banks that mark-to-market. Geanakoplos (2003) and Fostel and Geanako-
plos (2008) stress the importance of collateral constraints for balance sheet dynamics. For instance, a
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The ability of banks to take on additional exposure is therefore limited by their capital
cushion (Danielsson et al., 2012). In particular, a better capitalized bank may be able to
act in a counter-cyclical fashion, a strategy that pays o↵ only at longer horizons, as it is
relatively less sensitive to losses on their security holdings in the short run.22 In contrast,
a bank with a lower capital ratio is more sensitive to losses on their securities. Therefore,
it may be rational for these banks to act pro-cyclically, as this is a relatively less risky
strategy due to the short-term momentum component of bond prices.23 In order to shed
light on the question of whether a balance sheet channel is actually at work, I test whether
there is heterogeneity in the cyclical investment behavior across banks depending on their
degree of capitalization.
Hypothesis 1 Banks with tighter capital constraints act relatively more pro-cyclically.
In order to test Hypothesis 1, I obtain data on bank-level security holdings. The
dataset covers every bank in Germany and their security holdings from 2005 Q4 through
2014 Q4. For all 1954 banks in my sample I define the capital ratio of the bank as the ratio
of equity to total assets. I fix the capital ratio at the beginning of the sample to assure
that changes in the capital ratio are not driven by active balance sheet management,
see e.g. Adrian and Shin (2010).24 The empirical strategy uses the bank’s capital ratio
and interacts it with the price change of the security. I expect a negative coe cient
for the interaction term of the price change with the capitalization measure, i.e. poorer
capitalized banks act relatively more pro-cyclically.
The empirical specification for column (4) in Table 4 is as follows:
Netbuyi,s,t =  1 Prices,t 1 ⇤ Capitali + ↵s,t + ↵i,t + ✏i,s,t (3)
This is the most conservative specification and includes security⇤time fixed e↵ects and
institution⇤time fixed e↵ects. This allows me to control for all unobserved time-varying
institution and security-specific characteristics. The separate inclusion of security fixed
e↵ects, time fixed e↵ects and institution fixed e↵ects is not possible as they are spanned by
the inclusion of security⇤time and institution⇤time fixed e↵ects. In addition, the inclusion
of the level of the price change and the capital ratio is not possible due to collinearity with
the fixed e↵ects. Standard errors are double clustered at the security and institution-level
to account for serial correlation between observations of the same security and institution
across time.25
higher levered bank is more sensitive to price changes as it alters the collateral value a bank can borrow
against. This is independent whether the bank marks-to-market their security holdings. In addition,
lower capitalized banks are more vulnerable as they mechanically have a larger share of unstable fund-
ing. Adrian et al. (2015) also point out that accounting rules are unlikely the reason for balance sheet
dynamics. Laux and Leuz (2010), Allen and Carletti (2008) and Plantin et al. (2008) describe the
mark-to-market behavior of banks in more detail.
22See Abbassi et al. (2016).
23While I pose the assumption here that pro-cyclical investment behavior is relatively less risky at short
horizons than counter-cyclical investment behavior, I test this more formally in section 5.
24In this regression, I am only interested in the cross-sectional variation of the cyclical investment
behavior across banks. If I used the contemporaneous capital ratio instead, the coe cient could be
driven by both changes in the capital ratio over time and the cross-sectional component. The capital is
the book value and not the market value of equity.
25The results are even stronger when I cluster either on the security, on the institution or on the
security-institution level. The results also hold when I include security⇤institution fixed e↵ects.
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Table 4 shows that the coe cient of the interaction between the price change and the
capital ratio is negative and statistically significant. A one percentage point lower capital
ratio is associated with a 3.1 percentage point more pro-cyclical investment behavior for
a 10 percent price change. This result provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.
Since the price change is collinear with the security⇤time fixed e↵ect, the price change
coe cient is not identified in equation (3). Columns (1)-(2) relax this restriction so that
the level of the price change can be included in the regression specification. The results
also hold when I exclude institution⇤time fixed e↵ects and security⇤time fixed e↵ects.
For instance, column (2) shows the specification with security and institution⇤time fixed
e↵ects separately. Since the capital ratio is demeaned by the sample average, the level
coe cient can be interpreted as a response of a bank with an average capital ratio, which
is approximately 5 percent. A bank with a capital ratio of 5 percent increases the nominal
holdings by 6.5 percent in response to a 10 percent price increase. For every one percentage
point lower capital ratio, the response is 2.5 percentage points stronger. For instance, a
bank with a capital ratio of 4 percent increases its holdings by 9 percent instead of 6.5
percent.
4.1.2 Investment Funds
The investment fund industry in Germany is a significant sector, with an aggregate balance
sheet of 1.7 trillion Euros in 2014 (more than 50 percent of Germany’s GDP). In Germany,
the sector consists almost exclusively of open-end mutual funds, such as bond and mixed
funds.26 The leverage of these investment funds is limited. Figure 6 shows that only 2
percent of their liability side consists of loans. At first glance, the fact that investment
funds are not vulnerable to runs on their debt liabilities may raise doubts about their
contribution to systemic risk. As their investors provide equity capital, this suggests that
investment funds can be seen as benign with respect to financial stability.
However, investors in open-end mutual funds can draw down their capital quickly.
This changes the assets under management of the fund, which is the fund’s equity capital.
In other words, investment funds’ capital is not permanent, unlike the equity capital of
non-financial corporations. As investment fund shares issued make up the lion’s share of
investment funds’ liabilities, simple metrics like the total assets to equity ratio can lead
to misleading conclusions when it comes to identifying financial vulnerabilities. Once
investors start redeeming assets, a feedback loop between redemptions by investors and
sales of portfolio managers can emerge, as the redemptions of investors are usually not
orthogonal to the performance of the investment fund.27 In particular, losses on security
holdings are associated with investor redemptions; since investment funds are averse to
redemptions from investors, they may have incentives to limit short-term losses. This is
particularly strong when investment funds already su↵ered outflows, as higher outflows
make them more vulnerable to falling prices.28 From this the following hypothesis arises:
26In 2014 there have been 5,923 investment funds in Germany of which 57.2 percent are mixed mutual
funds and 15 percent are bond mutual funds. Only 0.5 percent are hedge funds.
27See e.g. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Chen et al. (2010) for the relationship between fund outflows
and performance.
28See also Goldstein et al. (2015), Feroli et al. (2014) and Morris and Shin (2015) for empirical and
theoretical evidence on this channel.
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Hypothesis 2 Investment funds with more net outflows act relatively more pro-cyclically.
In order to test Hypothesis 2, I use data on all investment funds and their security-
level holdings. However, in contrast to the bank-level security-level holdings data, the
data on investment funds is only available from 2009 Q4 onwards. First, I define the net
outflow of a fund as
NetOutflowi,t =  (Sharesi,t   Sharesi,t 1
NAVi,t 1
) (4)
Shares are the investment fund’s shares outstanding at face value to control for out-
flows to be driven mechanically by the price of the investment fund. NAV is the net asset
value, used to scale for how large the outflows are relative to the size of the investment
fund.
I estimate the following specification to test whether investment funds that su↵ered
more outflows indeed rebalance their portfolio towards securities that have been risen
versus those that have been fallen:
Netbuyi,s,t =  1 Prices,t 1 ⇤NetOutflowi,t 1 + ↵s,t + ↵i,t + ✏i,s,t (5)
Column (4) of Table 5 shows the results with double clustered standard errors at
the security and institution-level to account for serial correlation between observations of
the same security and institution across time.29 A 10 percent net outflow is associated
with a 1.8 percentage point stronger pro-cyclical investment behavior for a 10 percent
price change. Column (2) shows the results without security⇤time fixed e↵ects but with
institution⇤time and security fixed e↵ects so that the price change coe cient is identified.
The results can be interpreted as follows: an investment funds without outflows increases
its security holdings by 1.8 percent to a 10 percent price increase, while a fund that su↵ers
10 percent net outflows increases the amount by 3.1 percent.30
4.1.3 Insurance Companies and Pension Funds
The total size of the insurance companies’ and pension funds’ balance sheet in Germany
in 2014 was 2.4 trillion Euros (more than 80 percent of Germany’s GDP). On the asset
side, cash and deposit holdings are much larger than for banks and contribute 21 per-
cent to total assets, while almost 60 percent are securities (Figure 7). The leverage ratio
of insurance companies is much smaller compared to banks. The lion’s share of liabili-
ties is represented by insurance technical reserves; these are net equity of households in
life insurance and pension fund reserves or prepayments of insurance premiums and re-
serves for outstanding claims. These long-term liabilities are mostly contingent and their
payouts are relatively independent of the state of the real economy and overall financial
conditions. This predictable liability structure may give insurance companies and pension
29The results are even stronger when I cluster either on the security, on the institution or on the
security-institution level. The results also hold when I include security⇤institution fixed e↵ects.
30Although the price change coe cient is economically large and significant, it is not statistically
significant. The standard error suggests that there is large heterogeneity in the cyclical investment
behavior across investment funds which is exploited by the interaction with the net outflow variable.
However, other kinds of heterogeneities are worth exploring in future research.
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funds more autonomy in their portfolio choice as compared to banks or investment funds.
For instance, an accident with an insured car, a damage to an insured building or a death
of a person are events that could be covered by insurance companies and cause payouts.
As the structure of the liability side of insurance companies’ and pension funds’ balance
sheet is relatively persistent, this keeps their funding and rollover risk relatively moderate
and leaves them with more “skin in the game”.31 In addition, insurance companies and
pension funds in Germany do not have to mark-to-market their security holdings (Fabozzi,
2012).32 This may enable “deep pocket investors”, such as insurance companies and pen-
sion funds, to buy securities when prices have dropped when other actors, such as banks
and investment funds, may sell these securities. When prices have decreased, insurance
companies and pension funds can benefit from a reversal of the price if they hold on to the
security. Therefore, insurance companies and pension funds may act counter-cyclically
due to their more stable balance sheet as compared to those of banks and investment
funds.
However, while insurance companies and pension funds are less sensitive to losses
on their security holdings than banks and investment funds, they are unlikely to be
totally unconstrained investors. While their long-term liabilities relative to their assets
are usually an advantage, the duration mismatch of assets and liabilities can also become
problematic. Insurance companies and pension funds discount their net equity with the
risk-free rate. When the risk-free rate falls, insurance companies’ and pension funds’
liabilities increase relatively more due to their negative duration gap. In order to prevent
having a duration mismatch that is too large, insurance companies and pension funds
may buy long-term bonds, independent of the price change. While it is usually the case
that insurance companies and pension funds buy securities whose value dropped most,
this may change when the duration mismatch increases. When interest rates fall, the
prices of long-term bonds rise and the duration mismatch of insurance companies and
pension funds increases. In order to investigate whether the duration mismatch is indeed
a balance sheet constraint that a↵ects the investment behavior of insurance companies
and pension funds, I test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 Insurance companies and pension funds act relatively less counter-cyclically
when their duration mismatch increases.
Security holdings data is not available on the institution-level for insurance companies
and pension funds. In order to test the hypothesis, I instead use balance sheet data for the
insurance company and pension fund sector in Germany provided by the Deutsche Bun-
desbank and proxy the duration mismatch by constructing a maturity mismatch measure
by dividing insurance companies’ and pension funds’ long-term liabilities by their long-
term assets. A higher ratio of long-term liabilities to long-term assets is associated with
a higher on-balance sheet maturity mismatch. Since the duration of an asset is closely
linked to its maturity, the maturity mismatch can be seen as a proxy for the duration
mismatch.33
31Acharya et al. (2011) discuss the systemic importance of insurance companies for the global economy
in more detail. Manconi et al. (2016) document their selling behavior when they face a large outflow.
32With the introduction of Solvency II in January 2016, insurance companies and pension have to
mark-to-market their security holdings.
33Of course, insurance companies and pension funds can use interest swaps to hedge their interest rate
14
In order to test this hypothesis, I estimate the following specification:
Netbuys,t =  1 Prices,t 1 +  2 Mismatcht 1 ⇤ Prices,t 1 + ↵t + ↵s + ✏s,t (6)
The results are shown in column (2) of Table 6. The specification includes security
fixed e↵ects to control for time-invariant security-specific characteristics. Time fixed ef-
fects control for observed and unobserved time-specific characteristics. As this regression
is on the sector-level, all sector-specific time trends are also controlled for. If Hypothesis
3 is true, I would expect a positive sign for the interaction of the change in the maturity
mismatch and the change in the price. The larger the mismatch, the more pro-cyclically
(less counter-cyclically) insurance companies and pension funds act on the capital markets
with respect to price changes.34
Column (2) of Table 6 shows that a one percentage point increase in the mismatch
ratio is indeed associated with a 3.5 percentage point weaker counter-cyclical investment
behavior for a 10 percent price change. Column (1) shows that this pattern holds when
time fixed e↵ects are not included in the regression. In this case counter-cyclical invest-
ment behavior is even stronger as insurance companies and pension funds seem to buy
more in general when prices fall. This also holds when I include macro-economic controls
in the regression instead of using time fixed e↵ects, seen in column (4). Column (5) is
the most conservative specification. In order to rule out that the duration mismatch is
correlated with other macro-economic variables and that the mismatch only picks up this
correlation, I control for the interaction between several macro-economic variables, such
as German GDP growth, inflation, the 10-year government bond yield, the EONIA and
the VIX and the price change. Even controlling for these other interaction terms, the
interaction of the price change with the mismatch ratio is still highly significant.
After having shown that insurance companies and pension funds act relatively less counter-
cyclically in times when the duration mismatch increases, this still poses the question what
drives the aggregate pattern of section 2, i.e. that insurance companies and pension funds
act counter-cyclically on average. One mechanism that could explain these findings is
the correlation of the tightness of their constraints with gains and losses on the portfolio
holdings. In contrast to investment funds and banks, whose constraints tighten when they
su↵er losses on their security holdings, the duration mismatch of insurance companies and
pension funds should, if anything, decrease when prices fall due to their negative duration
gap.35 Therefore, insurance companies and pension funds may use this comparative ad-
vantage to act counter-cyclically. I test the link between capital gains and the tightness
of the balance sheet constraint more formally in the next section.
4.2 Balance Sheet Constraints and Capital Gains
The above hypotheses and results suggest that there is a link between capital gains and
losses on their portfolio holdings of di↵erent investor types and the tightness of their
exposure. However, since hedging is expensive, insurance companies and pension funds may not fully
hedge their exposure.
34In recent work Domanski et al. (2017) provide a theoretical framework for this behavior. They also
provide consistent evidence with aggregate data.
35When interest rates fall and security prices rise, assets of insurance companies and pension funds
may rise relatively less than their liabilities due to their larger sensitivity to interest rate changes.
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constraints. As shown in the previous section, poorer capitalized banks and investment
funds with more outflows act relatively more pro-cyclically. When insurance companies’
and pension funds’ duration mismatch increases, they also tend to act relatively less
counter-cyclically.
In order to align the findings of section 2 with the overall pattern that insurance
companies and pension act counter-cyclically and the banking and investment fund sector
acts pro-cyclically, I test whether losses on portfolio holdings are a↵ecting the constraints
of the various institutions. When prices fall and losses on their security holdings lead to
tighter constraints, institutions may (i) be forced to sell securities or (ii) sell securities in
order to avoid further price falls tightening constraints even more. This may be the case
because pro-cyclical investment behavior is profitable in the short run. In order to test
whether the tightness of the constraint is related to the losses on the security holdings, I
estimate the following specification:
ConstraintXt = ↵ +  1Netgainst 1 + ✏t (7)
where X is either (i) investment funds, (ii) banks or (iii) insurance companies and pension
funds. For investment funds, I again use net outflows of a fund as defined in the last section
as a constraint; for banks I use capital over total assets at the beginning of the sample and
for insurance companies and pension funds I use the change in the maturity mismatch.36
These simple correlations in column (1), (2) and (4) of Table 7 confirm that banks’ and
investment funds’ constraints tighten when they su↵er losses on their security holdings
and insurance companies’ and pension funds’ constraints, if anything, loosen.
In order to test this correlation more structurally, I can use institution-level data for
banks and investment funds to estimate the following equation:
ConstraintXi,t =  1Netgainsi,t 1 + ↵i + ↵t + ✏i,t (8)
where X can be either investment funds or banks. The specification includes insti-
tution fixed e↵ects to control for unobserved and observed time-invariant heterogeneity
in the cross-section of investment funds or banks, e.g. some banks may be structurally
better capitalized than others. The specification also includes time fixed e↵ects to con-
trol for institution-invariant time trends. The results from the simple correlation can be
confirmed in columns (3) and (5) of Table 7. When banks su↵er losses on their secu-
rity holdings it tightens their constraints by reducing their capital. Losses on investment
funds’ balance sheets are associated with redemptions from investors.
5 Price Change Dynamics
5.1 Investment Behavior and Future Price Changes
In order to test how prices of securities move after various institutions have bought them,
I regress the di↵erence of the k period ahead log of the price and the current log of the
36I fix total assets at the beginning of the period to prevent the capital ratio to be driven by active
balance sheet management. However, here I am interested in the changes in capital over time. Therefore,
I only fix total assets at the beginning of the period so that changes in the capital ratio are only driven
by mark-to-market activities as well as equity issuance.
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price,  Prices,t+k, on the netbuy variable for each institution type X for security s as
follows:
 Prices,t+k =  1Netbuy
X
s,t + ↵t + ✏s,t+k (9)
where
 Prices,t+k = Prices,t+k   Prices,t (10)
and the price is expressed in logs and time fixed e↵ects, ↵t, control for market-wide
developments. Column (1) of Table 8, Table 9 and Table 10 report results for k=1. The
results show that the price of a security increases after banks and investment funds have
acquired the security. These results are in line with Adrian et al. (2010a,b, 2011) who show
that the investment behavior of banks can predict price changes and can even stimulate
the economy. A doubling in the nominal amount held is associated with a 0.12 percent
increase in the bond price in the next quarter for banks and 0.2 percent for investment
funds.
In contrast to the prices of securities that have been bought by banks and investment
funds, the prices of securities that have been bought by insurance companies and pension
funds do not increase significantly. Columns (2) and (3) of Table 10 show that prices
decrease two and three quarters after insurance companies and pension funds have bought
them. A doubling in the amount bought by insurance companies and pension funds result
on average in 0.2 percent lower bond prices after two and three quarters. However, after
ten quarters the results are reversed. For k=10, the prices of bonds have increased after
insurance companies and pension funds have bought them and decreased when banks and
investment funds have bought them. After twelve quarters bond prices are 1.7 percent
higher when insurance companies and pension funds have doubled their position. These
findings are consistent with the impression given by Figure 4 that the counter-cyclical
strategy of insurance companies and pension funds is not profitable at short horizons but
outperforms pro-cyclical investment behavior in the medium run.
5.2 Momentum and Reversal of Prices
Prior evidence suggests that price changes are positively auto-correlated at short horizons
but negatively correlated at longer horizons (Cutler et al., 1990, 1991; Moskowitz et al.,
2012).37 This would support the results of section 5.1 that pro-cyclical investment be-
havior is profitable at short horizons while counter-cyclical investment behavior pays o↵
at longer horizons. According to Cutler et al. (1990) price changes reflect a fundamental
and a transitory component. While the fundamental component follows a random walk,
the transitory component follows a first-order autoregressive process that is likely driven
by a dominance of noise traders who overreact to fundamental news. In the absence of
noise traders, investors are not expected to change their security holdings as a response
to price changes (Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). After rejecting this hypothesis in section 3,
this section delivers complementary evidence on the possible channel. Positive feedback
investing may be rational when the investment horizon is short and one has a strong loss
aversion at short horizons. In this case, it may be rational to have a positive demand
elasticity to price changes. In contrast, counter-cyclical investors, who have a negative
37Vayanos and Woolley (2013) propose a model of momentum and reversal.
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demand elasticity to price changes, may have a low short-term loss aversion but instead
aim to maximize their profits at long horizons.
Although the positive auto-correlation at short horizons and the negative auto-correlation
at longer horizons has been pointed out by previous papers, I study whether the same
pattern also holds in my data. Therefore, I estimate the following specification:
 Prices,t+k = ↵t+k +  1 Prices,t + ✏i,t+k (11)
Table 11 shows that banks and investment funds can indeed avoid short-term losses by
acting pro-cyclically, as price changes are positively auto-correlated at short horizons. In
contrast, as insurance companies’ and pension funds’ constraints do not tighten when
they su↵er losses on their security holdings, this may enable them to step in when bonds
are cheap. That this counter-cyclical investment strategy can be profitable when prices
revert can be seen in Table 11. Given that insurance companies and pension funds act
on longer horizons, one would expect them to buy potentially undervalued securities as
they have the comparative advantage to wait until the prices revert. I turn to this topic
in the next section.
6 Additional Tests
6.1 Investment Behavior and Excess Bond Yields
As shown above, banks and investment funds act in a pro-cyclical manner to price changes.
This behavior can be profitable in the short run but is less profitable than the investment
behavior of insurance companies and pension funds in the medium run. Since banks and
investment funds trade on shorter horizons than do insurance companies and pension
funds, they might be more averse to liquidity risk. In this section, I define an excess bond
yield; the yield spread of a security that cannot be justified by credit risk, to test this
hypothesis. An increase in the excess bond yield reflects an increase in returns without an
increase in credit risk. That the excess bond yield increases might be due to lower liquidity,
which may not be part of the fundamental value. Therefore, changes in the excess bond
yield could arguably be interpreted as variation of the non-fundamental component of the
bond.
My approach is similar to the one of Gilchrist and Zakrajˇsek (2012). First, I define
a risk-free yield for five maturity buckets, i.e. for 1-3 years, 3-5 years, 5-7 years, 10-20
years, above 20 years.38 I define the risk-free yield as the yield of a German government
security in each benchmark. In order to define an excess bond yield, I regress the security-
specific yield-to-maturity on the risk-free yield of its maturity bucket, a categorial credit
rating variable and a security fixed e↵ect to control for time-invariant security-specific
characteristics such as exchange rate risk if the security is denominated in foreign currency.
I estimate the following regression:
Y ields,t =  1Y ield
rf
m,t +  
0Ratings,t + ↵s + ✏s,t (12)
where Rating is a vector of dummies for each rating category. I take the residual of
38I follow Ellul et al. (2011) for the choice of the maturity groups.
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this regression and define:
ExcessBondY ield = ✏s,t (13)
Yields may be higher for bonds that are more di cult to sell, especially in times of
market turmoil. Illiquidity is only a risk for short-term investors that need to sell securities
at short horizons. Investors that hold securities until maturity should not be reluctant to
hold these securities. In contrast, these investors should even buy these securities when
the liquidity premium goes up when these also yield higher expected future returns.
Therefore, I investigate which investors are buying and selling bonds whose excess
bond yields rise as follows:
NetbuyXs,t =  1 ExcessBondY ield+ ↵s + ↵t + ✏s,t (14)
Table 12 shows the results of a regression of the netbuy variable on the excess bond
yield.39 Insurance companies and pension funds buy securities whose excess bond yields
increase and sell them when the excess bond yield decreases. In particular, column (3)
shows that a one percentage point increase in the excess bond yield is associated with a 2.3
percent increase in the nominal amount held. This might be the case because insurance
companies and pension funds often hold bonds until maturity and do not have to sell at
short notice. In contrast, banks and investment funds buy when the excess bond yield
falls and sell when the excess bond yield increases.
If changes in the excess bond yield are interpreted as changes away from their fun-
damental value, these results suggest that banks and investment funds are pushing away
prices from fundamentals and insurance companies and pension funds stabilize prices and
push them towards fundamentals. Since banks and investment funds trade more fre-
quently than do insurance companies and pension funds, it may be rational for them to
consciously buy securities that are overvalued. Speculating on further price rises indicates
that investors attempt to ride the bubble and time the market by selling the security when
the price is at the inflection point (Brunnermeier and Nagel, 2004). The behavior of banks
to buy securities whose excess bond yield falls is consistent with the model of Shleifer and
Vishny (2010) who show that if banks believe that security prices will increase further,
they lever up and buy securities.40 However, once prices start to fall, banks cannot roll
over funding and may have to sell securities in order to de-lever again. Alternatively,
banks and investment funds may sell securities that trade below their fundamental value
if they expect the downward trend to continue further at short horizons, as shown in
Table 11.
In contrast, return-oriented investors who have a long-term investment horizon and
potentially hold securities until maturity may be buying up troubled assets when they
believe the security is undervalued in order to benefit from future price increases (Hanson
and Stein, 2015). In line with the typical behavior of return-oriented investors, insurance
companies and pension funds, who may be more risk tolerant due to their long-term
liabilities, buy assets whose excess bond yield has risen.41 This behavior can act as a
39Since the variable Excess Bond Yield is estimated, I bootstrap the standard errors.
40This behavior is also consistent with models that predict myopic behavior due to short-term incentives
(Stein, 1989).
41In the working paper version of this paper, I also show that insurance companies and pension funds
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stabilizing force in bad times and prevent prices from falling by as much as they would
otherwise. Selling securities whose excess bond yields are falling and whose prices are
potentially rising above their fundamental value on the other side can also prevent bubbles
from growing. These types of investors have received rather less attention but are certainly
important actors who can prevent the buildup of systemic risk that could materialize in
a crisis (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014).
6.2 Cyclical Investment Behavior and Risk
6.2.1 Credit Risk
While in the previous section I have used the credit rating in order to construct an excess
bond yield, I have neither used the credit rating unconditionally in order to test whether
the rating of the bond a↵ects their investment behavior, nor have I investigated whether
the cyclical investment behavior is di↵erent across rating categories. In order to do so, I
first construct a dummy that equals one if the security is rated investment grade and zero
otherwise. I interact the dummy, IG, with the price change. A positive coe cient shows
that institutions act relatively more pro-cyclically with respect to investment grade bonds.
Table 13 shows that the counter-cyclical investment behavior of insurance companies and
pension funds is more pronounced for non-investment grade bonds. It also shows that the
results are robust along two additional dimensions. First, the price change coe cient is
still highly significant even after controlling for the rating category. This allows me to rule
out the possibility that price changes due to rating category changes are driving the results,
see e.g. Ellul et al. (2011, 2015) and Merrill et al. (2012). Second, cyclical investment
bevavior is robust across rating types. For instance, while for insurance companies and
pension funds the cyclical investment behavior is di↵erent in magnitude for investment
grade bonds and non-investment grade bonds, insurance companies and pension funds
act counter-cyclically both with respect to investment grade bonds and non-investment
grade bonds. On the other side, banks and investment funds act pro-cyclically for both
types of categories.
6.2.2 Foreign Exchange Rate Risk
Table 14 looks at whether the cyclical investment behavior is di↵erent for bonds that are
denominated in foreign currency. I define a dummy that is equal to one if the bond is
denominated in foreign currency and zero otherwise. I interact the dummy FC with the
price change coe cient. A positive coe cient indicates that institutions act relatively
more pro-cyclically with respect to foreign currency bonds. Table 14 shows that the
results hold for both domestic currency and foreign currency bonds. The results are,
if anything, stronger for foreign currency bonds. This finding underlines the results by
Cerutti et al. (2015). They find that emerging markets that rely on investment funds and
banks as their main creditors, exhibit relatively higher volatility of their capital inflows.
They argue that it is important for emerging markets to monitor their investor base.
My results support their hypothesis and do not only apply to cross-border inflows into
buy securities that are trading at discount (Timmer, 2016). Buying these securities guarantees nominal
gains when the security is held until maturity unless it defaults.
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emerging market countries, but also more generally to both domestic and foreign investors
as well as corporates and governments.42
6.2.3 Market Risk
While the above measures focus on credit and foreign exchange rate risk, I have thus far
neglected the interaction between market risk and the price change. To address this, I
define a  dax in relation to the German stockmarket index by estimating the following
specification for each security s:
 Pricet = ↵ +  dax Daxt + ✏t (15)
whereDax is the log of the German stockmarket index. Then, I obtain the beta coe cient
for each security,  dax, which reflects the relation of the price change with the stockmarket.
A positive and large  dax indicates high systematic risk with respect to the stockmarket.
A coe cient of one reflects that the price of the security moves in tandem with the
stockmarket, on average. An investor whose benchmark portfolio is on average highly
correlated with the German stockmarket can buy securities with a low or even negative
 dax in order to hedge exposure to the stockmarket. Table 15 shows whether the cyclical
investment behavior of the various institutions di↵ers depending on the beta of the security
in question. For this, I interact the  dax with the price change of the security. A positive
coe cient on the interaction term shows that institutions act relatively more pro-cyclically
or less counter-cyclically with respect to bonds that reflect a higher systematic risk with
respect to the stockmarket. Column (4) shows that insurance companies and pension
funds act relatively more counter-cyclically with respect to bonds that have a larger beta.
In contrast, banks act relatively more pro-cyclically with respect to these bonds.43
Table A4 shows the same analysis but instead of using the price change of the security
and the percentage increase in the stockmarket index. I use the security-specific yield and
the risk-free yield (rf) to define  rf .44 Securities that have a large  rf move in tandem
with the risk-free securities and can be considered less risky. Table A4 shows that the
beta with respect to the risk-free yield does not seem to be important in determining the
cyclical investment behavior.45
One other dimension of risk is the volatility of the bond. I define the volatility of the
bond as its sample standard deviation and interact it with the price change. A positive
coe cient shows that institutions act relatively more pro-cyclically with respect to more
volatile bonds. Table A6 shows that banks seem to act relatively more pro-cyclically with
respect to less volatile bonds.
In order to investigate further whether the cyclical investment behavior changes over
the financial cycle, I look at times of a high VIX in the next step. When market liquidity is
low, pro-cyclical investment behavior can lead to strong market distortions and investors
may be forced to sell at fire-sale prices because they have to meet margin calls or they
cannot roll over their liabilities. If prices fall and investors act pro-cyclically during volatile
times, their redemption can trigger a spiral of market and funding liquidity (Brunnermeier
42Table A2 shows the results for German and foreign bonds.
43Table A3 show the results when the covariance instead of the  dax is used.
44I again use the German government bond in the respective maturity bucket as the risk-free yield.
45Table A5 shows the results for the covariance instead of the beta.
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and Pedersen, 2009). Amihud et al. (2006) and Amihud and Mendelson (1986), show
that short-term investors avoid illiquid securities in times of high expected volatility.
The probability that illiquid assets will have to be sold at fire-sale prices increases when
volatility increases. Hence, funds with daily reception notice should not hold illiquid assets
in volatile times if they want to avoid selling o↵ assets at fire-sale prices. In contrast, long-
term investors can benefit from a liquidity premium as short-term investors avoid illiquid
securities in times of high expected volatility.
In order to test whether the cyclical behavior of financial institutions intensifies in
volatile times, I interact the VIX with the change in the price. Column (1) of Table A7
shows that as soon as the VIX increases, investment funds exacerbate the pro-cyclicality,
which is in favor of the hypothesis that investment funds act relatively more pro-cyclically
in times when asset prices are down. However, once time fixed e↵ects are included, the
result diminishes. When the market in general is more volatile, measured by a high
VIX, investment funds and insurance companies and pension funds act relatively less
counter-cyclically (Table A7). However, even large movements in the VIX, e.g. a 100
percent increase in the VIX, does not make insurance companies and pension funds act
pro-cyclically. In addition, the result also diminishes when time fixed e↵ects are included.
This suggests that the results are not driven by specific time periods, which I test
more formally in the next section.
6.3 Crisis Split
In Table A8, Table A9 and Table A10 I divide the sample into three subsamples: pre-crisis
(2006 Q1:2008 Q1), crisis (2008 Q2:2012 Q3), and post-crisis (2012 Q4:2014 Q4).46 Even
in this very conservative specification with period-specific security fixed e↵ects, the results
are remarkably stable. Table A8 show the results for investment funds. In the pre-crisis
period, a 10 percent increase in the price is associated with a 1.3 percent increase in the
nominal holdings of the security when security fixed e↵ects are included and an increase
of 0.5 percent when both security and time fixed e↵ects are included. In the crisis they
increase the nominal amount both with and without time fixed e↵ects by 1.1 percent. In
the post-crisis period the response changes to 0.9 percent and 1.7 percent, respectively.
Table A9 shows that insurance companies and pension funds acted relatively more
counter-cyclically before the crisis. However, the counter-cyclical investment behavior
is still strong in the crisis and post-crisis period with elasticities between 0.16 and 0.53
depending on the specification.
For banks, the pro-cyclical investment behavior has been more pronounced before and
after the crisis with magnitudes of 0.5 to 0.8. During the crisis, the response was lower
in magnitude but still highly significant at the 1 percent significance level (Table A10).
Banks reduced their holdings by 2.5 percent and 3 percent as a response to a 10 percent
price decrease, depending on the specification.
462008 Q2 is the first quarter in which Germany’s seasonally adjusted quarterly GDP dropped the
first time in my sample. The end of the crisis period is defined as the quarter after Mario Draghi’s
announcement to do “whatever it takes to preserve the Euro”, which happened in 2012 Q3.
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6.4 Further Robustness
Additionally, I test whether the response is robust for both buying and selling behavior.
This can be confirmed in Table A11. Investment funds and banks buy when price rise
and sell when they fall. In contrast, insurance companies and pension funds buy when
prices fall and sell when prices rise.
Until now I have assumed that the coe cient is the same for corporate and government
bonds. In Table A12, I relax this assumption and allow the coe cient to vary by issuing
sector. In particular, I define a dummy for each of the three issuing sectors: government,
banks and other-financial corporates (ofc). I interact the price change with the respective
dummies. A positive coe cient can be interpreted as evidence for relatively more pro-
cyclical investment behavior compared to the benchmark of non-financial corporate bonds
(nfc). In general, I confirm my previous findings. In most cases, the highest quantitative
responses to price changes are with respect to non-financial corporate bonds. A 10 percent
increase in the price is associated with a 1.2 percent and 8.6 percent increase in the amount
held for investment funds and banks, respectively, but a 31 percent decrease by insurance
companies and pension funds.
While the sign of the coe cients is still in line with the benchmark model, the mag-
nitude of the cyclical investment behavior varies depending on the issuer type. Insurance
companies and pension funds act relatively less counter-cyclically with respect to bank,
other-financial corporate and government bonds. Banks and investment funds act rela-
tively less pro-cyclically with respect to government bonds but not significantly di↵erent
with respect to other-financial corporate and bank bonds.
To test the sensitivity of the price change coe cient to the inclusion of further controls,
Table A13 shows a summary of the lagged price change coe cients for various specifica-
tions. Controlling for more unobserved and observed characteristics also indicates whether
the sectors respond to relative price changes of the debt securities or whether the invest-
ment decision is driven by broad market valuations. Creating a more coherent sample
across the sectors sheds light on the question of whether the coe cients are driven by
a sample selection bias. The coe cient is consistently positive for investment funds and
banks and negative for insurance companies and pension funds. Row (1) is the result
of a simple regression of the netbuy variable on the lagged price change excluding any
controls. While the inclusion of security fixed e↵ects allows to make judgement about the
investment behavior in a specific security over time, excluding security fixed e↵ects does
not only capture the time-series variation but also the cross-sectional variation. Including
security fixed e↵ects controls for all time-invariant security-specific characteristics, such as
the coupon or the maturity date, but of course also for the issuing country of the security.
The approach using security fixed e↵ects focuses on one specific security and attempts
to explain the buying and selling behavior over time.47 Both regressions show that, uncon-
ditional and conditional on time-invariant security characteristics, banks and investment
funds respond pro-cyclically to price changes, while insurance companies and pension
funds act counter-cyclically.
Row (3) includes macro controls for Germany, i.e. German GDP growth, inflation, the
10-year government bond yield, the EONIA and the VIX. Row (4) assigns country-specific
47The coe cients vary slightly from Table 3 as the sample is harmonized in Table A13 to make coe -
cients better comparable.
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controls to the country of issue. Row (5) absorbs observed and unobserved country-
specific time-varying characteristics. In order to examine how financial institutions invest
in specific securities, compared to other securities that were issued in the same sector of
the same country, the specification is also saturated with sector⇤country⇤time fixed e↵ects.
This controls for unobserved and observed time-varying heterogeneity, such as the time-
varying common component of a specific asset class. In particular, it adds the issuing
sector dimension for banks, other-financial corporations, non-financial corporations, and
governments in their capacity as issuing sectors. Hence, for each issuing sector of a given
country I control for the average amount bought or sold at a given point in time, which
controls for broad market valuations of this index. Even within this benchmark, banks
and investment funds buy securities that have increased in value. However, while for
investment funds and banks the coe cients are even higher than in specification (5), the
coe cient for insurance companies and pension funds is relatively lower. This indicates
that insurance companies and pension funds tend to buy securities that are included in a
falling index. In contrast, banks’ and investment funds’ pro-cyclical investment behavior
is also driven by idiosyncratic movements of the security compared to its benchmark.48
To make the sample of securities held more comparable, row (7) restricts the security
sample to all securities that have been held by insurance companies and pension funds,
investment funds and banks at least once throughout the sample.
48In Table A14, I decompose the price change is into a broad market valuation of the issuing sector-
country index and an idiosyncratic part. For insurance companies and pension funds and banks the broad
price change movement is more important than the relative one. In contrast, for investment funds the
relative price change is more important than the broad index.
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7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes the cyclical investment behavior of investment funds, banks and
insurance companies and pension funds. I show that banks and investment funds are
pro-cyclical investors with respect to price changes. In contrast, insurance companies and
pension funds respond counter-cyclically to price changes: they buy when prices have
fallen and sell when prices have gone up.
One channel that could generate the heterogeneity in the cyclical investment behavior
is based on the investors’ balance sheet dynamics. I provide evidence that is consistent
with this channel by exploiting cross-sectional heterogeneity between institutions for banks
and investment funds. The pro-cyclical investment behavior is stronger for banks that
are relatively weaker capitalized and investment funds that face relatively more outflows.
Although investment funds use almost no leverage, both investment funds and banks are
sensitive to short-term losses on their security holdings. In order to avoid these losses,
they act pro-cyclically as prices exhibit a short-term momentum factor. Since insurance
companies’ and pension funds’ balance sheets are more resilient to short-term losses, they
can act in a counter-cyclical manner.
The pro-cyclical investment behavior of investment funds and banks resulted in rela-
tively mild losses during the European sovereign debt crisis. Although insurance compa-
nies and pension funds su↵ered severe losses during the crisis, they outperformed banks
and investment funds in the medium run.
The results suggest that the investment behavior of insurance companies and pension
funds can be a stabilizing force on capital markets. In contrast, the investment behavior of
banks and investment funds can exacerbate price dynamics and lead to excessive volatility
in capital markets. These results underline the findings of Cerutti et al. (2015) who argue
that it can be hazardous for countries to rely on investment funds and banks as their
main investors.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A: Insurance Companies and Pension Funds
Holdings Buy Sell Netbuy Buy % Sell %  Price
Mean 22.634 11.021 9.768 -0.003 0.311 -0.305 0.001
Std. 78.122 35.295 33.349 0.670 0.577 0.612 0.037
Obs. 136954 14665 15183 29848 14665 15183 734517
Panel B: Investment Funds
Holdings Buy Sell Netbuy Buy % Sell %  Price
Mean 31.842 5.887 6.192 -0.012 0.218 -0.212 0.001
Std. 115.805 26.240 24.487 0.438 0.389 0.377 0.037
Obs. 383521 107737 124584 232321 107737 124584 734517
Panel C: Banks
Holdings Buy Sell Netbuy Buy % Sell %  Price
Mean 57.641 12.749 15.800 -0.002 0.372 -0.407 0.001
Std. 167.278 47.811 58.529 0.812 0.669 0.758 0.037
Obs. 475782 62553 57783 120336 62553 57783 734517
Holdings is the nominal value held if a security is held (in million Euros). Buy and sell refers to the
amount bought and sold in million Euros. Netbuy is the change in the log of the nominal amount
held. Buy % (Sell %) is the change in the log of the nominal amount held if positive (negative).
 Price is the change in the log of the price. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the
Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, 2004 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s
calculations.
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Table 2: Heterogeneity in Cyclical Investment Behavior   Interactions
Dependent variable: Netbuy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Price -0.576⇤⇤⇤ -0.850⇤⇤⇤ -0.429⇤⇤⇤
(0.115) (0.116) (0.132)
 Price ⇤ Funds 0.718⇤⇤⇤ 0.955⇤⇤⇤ 0.565⇤⇤⇤ 0.647⇤⇤⇤ 0.861⇤⇤⇤ 0.428⇤⇤
(0.117) (0.118) (0.134) (0.145) (0.159) (0.186)
 Price ⇤ Banks 0.912⇤⇤⇤ 1.191⇤⇤⇤ 0.789⇤⇤⇤ 0.993⇤⇤⇤ 1.359⇤⇤⇤ 0.855⇤⇤⇤
(0.140) (0.143) (0.158) (0.176) (0.186) (0.217)
R-squared 0.0834 0.119 0.123 0.453 0.529 0.532
Observations 386618 382505 382505 147449 147449 147449
Security FE Yes - - - - -
Time FE Yes No - - - -
Security⇤Time FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Sector⇤Time FE No No Yes No No Yes
Security⇤Sector FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held.  Price is the change in the log of the
price and is lagged by one quarter. Banks is a dummy that equals one for banks and zero otherwise. Funds is a
dummy that equals one for investment funds and zero otherwise. The benchmark is insurance companies and pension
funds. Fixed e↵ects are either included (Yes), not included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard
errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
Table 3: Heterogeneity in Cyclical Investment Behavior   Sample Split
Dependent variable: Netbuy
Funds ICPF Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Price 0.105⇤⇤⇤ 0.136⇤⇤⇤ -0.850⇤⇤⇤ -0.429⇤⇤⇤ 0.341⇤⇤⇤ 0.361⇤⇤⇤
(0.024) (0.026) (0.116) (0.132) (0.084) (0.088)
R-squared 0.120 0.126 0.161 0.173 0.112 0.114
Observations 232321 232321 29848 29848 120336 120336
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held.  Price is the change in the
log of the price and is lagged by one quarter. Column (1)-(2) estimate the specification for the investment
fund sector. Column (3)-(4) estimate the specification for the insurance companies and pension fund sector.
Column (5)-(6) estimate the specification for the banking sector. Fixed e↵ects are either included (Yes), not
included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered at the security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase
Securities Holdings Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
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Table 4: Bank Heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Netbuy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Price 0.584⇤⇤ 0.647⇤⇤
(0.232) (0.271)
 Price ⇤ Capital -10.44⇤⇤ -24.52⇤ -18.67⇤⇤⇤ -31.49⇤⇤
(4.300) (12.952) (6.833) (14.146)
R-squared 0.116 0.126 0.236 0.247
Observations 1643361 1643361 1643361 1643361
Security FE Yes Yes - -
Institution FE Yes - Yes -
Time FE Yes - - -
Institution⇤Time FE No Yes No Yes
Security⇤Time FE No No Yes Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held for banks
on the institution-level.  Price is the change in the log of the price and is lagged by one
quarter. Capital is equity as a ratio of its total assets at the beginning of the period.
Capital is demeaned by the average across banks. Fixed e↵ects are either included (Yes),
not included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard errors are in parentheses.
Standard errors are double clustered at the security and institution-level and robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source:
Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities
Holdings Statistics, monthly bank balance sheet statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s
calculations.
Table 5: Investment Fund Heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Netbuy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 Price 0.0885 0.177
(0.302) (0.277)
 Price ⇤ Net Outflow 1.486⇤⇤ 1.259⇤⇤ 1.920⇤⇤⇤ 1.789⇤⇤⇤
(0.722) (0.572) (0.608) (0.584)
R-squared 0.340 0.435 0.422 0.507
Observations 2554558 2554558 2554558 2554558
Security FE Yes Yes - -
Time FE Yes - Yes -
Institution FE Yes - - -
Institution⇤Time FE No Yes No Yes
Security⇤Time FE No No Yes Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held for investment
funds on the institution-level.  Price is the change in the log of the price. Net Outflow is
the negative of the change in the face value of shares outstanding as a ratio of the lagged
Net Asset Value. The level of Net Outflow is included in the specification whenever not
collinear with the fixed e↵ects. All independent variables are lagged by one quarter. Fixed
e↵ects are either included (Yes), not included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-).
Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are double clustered at the security
and institution-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1,⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, investment fund statistics,
2009 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
33
Table 6: ICPF Heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Netbuy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 Price -0.831⇤⇤⇤ -0.416⇤⇤⇤ -0.926⇤⇤⇤ -0.926⇤⇤⇤ -0.602⇤⇤⇤
(0.115) (0.132) (0.136) (0.136) (0.159)
 Price ⇤  Mismatch 32.26⇤⇤⇤ 34.77⇤⇤⇤ 40.56⇤⇤⇤ 40.56⇤⇤⇤ 37.98⇤⇤⇤
(6.822) (8.447) (9.022) (9.022) (10.102)
R-squared 0.162 0.174 0.168 0.168 0.174
Observations 29848 29848 29848 29848 29848
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No No Yes
Macro Controls No - Yes Yes -
Macro Interactions No No No Yes Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held for insurance companies and
pension funds.  Price is the change in the log of the price.  Mismatch is the change in the ratio of long-
term liabilities to long-term assets of insurance companies and pension funds. The level of  Mismatch is
included in the specification whenever not collinear with the fixed e↵ects. Macro controls include the German
GDP growth, inflation, the 10-year government bond yield, the EONIA and the VIX. Macro interaction are
the respective interaction of the macro controls with the price change. All independent variables are lagged
by one quarter. Fixed e↵ects are either included (Yes), not included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects
(-). Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the security-level and robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data
and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, Deutsche
Bundesbank, time series database, banks and other financial institutions, insurance corporations and pension
funds, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
Table 7: Capital Gains and Balance Sheet Constraints
  Mismatch Capital Net Outflows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net Capital Gains 0.0542 0.0937⇤⇤⇤ 0.257⇤⇤⇤ -0.217⇤⇤⇤ -0.0822⇤⇤⇤
(0.054) (0.034) (0.008) (0.072) (0.007)
R-squared 0.0292 0.186 0.807 0.303 0.335
Observations 36 36 59563 36 92870
Time FE - - Yes - Yes
Institution FE - - Yes - Yes
The dependent variable  Mismatch is the change in the ratio of long-term liabilities to long-term assets
of insurance companies and pension funds; Capital is equity as a ratio of its total assets with assets being
fixed at the beginning of the period; Net Outflow is the negative of the change in the face value of shares
outstanding as a ratio of the lagged Net Asset Value. Net Capital Gains are sector or institution specific
net capital gains on security holdings and lagged by one quarter. Columns (1), (2) & (4) are on the sector
sector-level. Columns (3) & (5) are on the institution-level. Fixed e↵ects are either included (Yes), not
included (No) or cannot be included (-). Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered at the institution-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in column (3) and
(5). ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, Deutsche Bundesbank, time series database,
banks and other financial institutions, investment fund statistics, monthly balance sheet statistics, 2005 Q4
- 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
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Table 8: Future Price Changes   Investment Funds
Dependent variable: Pricet+k Pricet
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=6 k=8 k=10 k=12
NetbuyFunds 0.201⇤⇤⇤ 0.209 -0.0514 -0.0321 -0.893⇤⇤⇤ -1.363⇤⇤⇤ -1.570⇤⇤⇤ -0.392
(0.067) (0.132) (0.163) (0.216) (0.307) (0.363) (0.425) (0.408)
R-squared 0.0253 0.0265 0.0267 0.0314 0.0356 0.0389 0.0471 0.0534
Observations 508645 458306 413195 371909 303699 243732 195595 154294
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the price between quarter t+k and t. NetbuyFunds is the change in the log of the
nominal amount held of investment funds. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the security-level
and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service
Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
Table 9: Future Price Changes   Banks
Dependent variable: Pricet+k-Pricet
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=6 k=8 k=10 k=12
NetbuyBanks 0.123⇤⇤⇤ -0.0182 -0.319⇤⇤⇤ -0.353⇤⇤⇤ -0.257⇤⇤ -0.251⇤ -0.227 -0.736⇤⇤⇤
(0.036) (0.053) (0.082) (0.090) (0.106) (0.130) (0.167) (0.175)
R-squared 0.0253 0.0265 0.0268 0.0315 0.0355 0.0388 0.0469 0.0536
Observations 508645 458306 413195 371909 303699 243732 195595 154294
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the price between quarter t+k and t. NetbuyBanks is the change in the log
of the nominal amount held of banks. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the security-level and
robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre
of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
Table 10: Future Price Changes   ICPF
Dependent variable: Pricet+k-Pricet
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=6 k=8 k=10 k=12
NetbuyICPF 0.0714 -0.213⇤⇤ -0.233⇤ -0.188 -0.497⇤⇤ -0.277 0.761⇤⇤⇤ 1.753⇤⇤⇤
(0.056) (0.097) (0.126) (0.169) (0.243) (0.255) (0.260) (0.268)
R-squared 0.0253 0.0265 0.0267 0.0314 0.0355 0.0387 0.0470 0.0536
Observations 508645 458306 413195 371909 303699 243732 195595 154294
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the price between quarter t+k and t. NetbuyICPF is the change in the
log of the nominal amount held of insurance companies and pension funds. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered at the security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings
Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
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Table 11: Momentum and Reversal in Prices
Dependent variable: Pricet+k Pricet
k=1 k=2 k=3 k=4 k=6 k=8 k=10 k=12
 Price 0.0460⇤⇤⇤ 0.0358⇤⇤⇤ -0.0173⇤⇤⇤ 0.00378 0.00332 -0.0162 -0.122⇤⇤⇤ -0.0741⇤⇤⇤
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.018)
R-squared 0.191 0.193 0.182 0.177 0.158 0.115 0.0479 0.0420
Observations 445056 394264 352757 314980 247176 193422 147924 113408
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the price between quarter t+k and t.  Price is the change in the log of the
price between quarter t and t-1. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the security-level and robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
Table 12: Excess Bond Yield
Dependent variable: Netbuy
Funds ICPF Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Excess Yield -0.00225⇤ -0.00259⇤ 0.0225⇤⇤⇤ 0.0110⇤ -0.0222⇤⇤⇤ -0.0205⇤⇤⇤
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003)
R-squared 0.160 0.165 0.336 0.346 0.201 0.203
Observations 190824 190824 24882 24882 90967 90967
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held.   Excess Yield is the lagged change
in the residual of a regression of the yield-to-maturity on the risk-free yield within its maturity bucket, an indicator
variable for the credit rating and a security fixed e↵ect. Column (1)-(2) estimate the specification for the investment
fund sector. Column (3)-(4) estimate the specification for the insurance companies and pension fund sector. Column
(5)-(6) estimate the specification for the banking sector. Fixed e↵ects are either included (Yes), not included
(No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard errors are in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors
are clustered at the security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities
Holdings Statistics, Bloomberg, Datastream, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
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Table 13: Credit Rating
Dependent variable: Netbuy
Funds ICPF Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Price 0.0800⇤⇤⇤ 0.0989⇤⇤⇤ -1.253⇤⇤⇤ -0.921⇤⇤⇤ 0.262⇤⇤ 0.271⇤⇤
(0.028) (0.030) (0.198) (0.196) (0.120) (0.120)
IG 0.000435 -0.0164 0.137⇤⇤ 0.0400 0.0398 0.0121
(0.019) (0.019) (0.061) (0.066) (0.035) (0.035)
 Price ⇤ IG 0.0988⇤ 0.149⇤⇤⇤ 0.683⇤⇤⇤ 0.859⇤⇤⇤ 0.184 0.212
(0.051) (0.052) (0.247) (0.248) (0.167) (0.169)
R-squared 0.120 0.126 0.161 0.174 0.112 0.114
Observations 232321 232321 29848 29848 120336 120336
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held.  Price is the change
in the log of the price and is lagged by one quarter. IG is a dummy that equals one if the security
is rated investment grade and zero otherwise and is lagged by one quarter. Column (1)-(2) estimate
the specification for the investment fund sector. Column (3)-(4) estimate the specification for the in-
surance companies and pension fund sector. Column (5)-(6) estimate the specification for the banking
sector. Fixed e↵ects are either included (Yes), not included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-).
Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the security-level and robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and
Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, Bloomberg,
Datastream, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
Table 14: Foreign Currency Bonds
Dependent variable: Netbuy
Funds ICPF Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Price 0.101⇤⇤ 0.212⇤⇤⇤ -0.709⇤⇤⇤ -0.243 0.165⇤ 0.198⇤
(0.050) (0.053) (0.131) (0.151) (0.099) (0.105)
 Price ⇤ FC 0.00445 -0.0921 -0.588⇤⇤ -0.763⇤⇤⇤ 0.509⇤⇤⇤ 0.452⇤⇤
(0.057) (0.059) (0.284) (0.281) (0.184) (0.185)
R-squared 0.120 0.126 0.161 0.173 0.112 0.114
Observations 232314 232314 29848 29848 120336 120336
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held.  Price is the change
in the log of the price and is lagged by one quarter. FC is a dummy that equals one if the security
is denominated in foreign currency and zero otherwise. Column (1)-(2) estimate the specification for
the investment fund sector. Column (3)-(4) estimate the specification for the insurance companies and
pension fund sector. Column (5)-(6) estimate the specification for the banking sector. Fixed e↵ects
are either included (Yes), not included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard errors are
in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of
the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s
calculations.
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Table 15:   Stockmarket
Dependent variable: Netbuy
Funds ICPF Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Price 0.122⇤⇤⇤ 0.162⇤⇤⇤ -0.841⇤⇤⇤ -0.342⇤⇤ 0.275⇤⇤⇤ 0.300⇤⇤⇤
(0.032) (0.036) (0.144) (0.147) (0.099) (0.095)
 Price ⇤  Dax -0.135 -0.210 -0.651 -1.551⇤⇤ 0.841⇤⇤ 0.670⇤⇤
(0.141) (0.188) (0.509) (0.725) (0.353) (0.326)
R-squared 0.116 0.122 0.160 0.172 0.109 0.110
Observations 230374 230374 29609 29609 117616 117616
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held.  Price is the change in the
log of the price and is lagged by one quarter.  Dax is the coe cient obtained from a regression of the
price change of the security on the percentage change of the German stockmarket index (Dax).  Dax is
demeaned and standardized by the sample standard deviation. Column (1)-(2) estimate the specification
for the investment fund sector. Column (3)-(4) estimate the specification for the insurance companies
and pension fund sector. Column (5)-(6) estimate the specification for the banking sector. Fixed e↵ects
are either included (Yes), not included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard errors are in
parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of
the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, Bloomberg, Datastream, 2005 Q4
- 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
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Figure 1: Nominal Debt Security Holdings of Banks
Note: The Figure shows the nominal value of debt securities held by banks. Source: Author’s calculations;
Data: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings
Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4.
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Figure 2: Nominal Debt Security Holdings of Investment Funds
Note: The Figure shows the nominal value of debt securities held by investment funds. Source: Author’s
calculations; Data: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase
Securities Holdings Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4.
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Figure 3: Nominal Debt Security Holdings of Insurance Companies and Pension Funds
Note: The Figure shows the nominal value of debt securities held by insurance companies and pen-
sion funds. Source: Author’s calculations; Data: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4.
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Figure 4: Capital Gains on Security Holdings
Note: The Figure shows the capital gains of Banks, Investment Funds and insurance companies and
pension funds (ICPF ). The capital gains are calculated as the di↵erence between the total market value
of all securities and the total nominal value of all securities divided by the total nominal value of all
securities. Source: Author’s calculations; Data: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4.
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Figure 5: Balance Sheet of Banks in Germany
Other
Debt Securities
Loans to Banks
Loans to Non−Banks
Other
Debt Securities Issued
Interbank Borrowing
Retail Deposits
Capital
Assets Liabilities
Note: Assets (in EUR billions, share of total assets): Loans to Non-Banks (3127, 40%), Loans to Banks
(1950, 25%), Debt Securities (1176, 15%), Others (1599, 20%); Liabilities (in EUR billions, share of
total liabilities): Capital (382, 5%), Retail Deposits (3299, 42%), Interbank Borrowing (1717, 22%), Debt
Securities issued (1115, 14%), Other (1341, 17%); Total: EUR 7853 billion. Source: Author’s calculations;
Data: Deutsche Bundesbank, time series database, banks and other financial institutions, banks.
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Figure 6: Balance Sheet of Investment Funds in Germany
Other
Cash and Deposits
Investment Fund Shares
Equity Securities
Debt Securities
Other
Investment Fund Shares issued
Assets Liabilities
Note: Assets (in EUR billions, share of total assets): Debt Securities (825, 50%), Equity Securities (303,
18%), Investment Fund Shares (277, 17%), Cash and Deposits (70, 4%), Other (179, 11%); Liabilities
(in EUR billions, share of total liabilities): Investment Fund Shares issued (1597, 97%), Other (56,
3%); Total: EUR 1653 billion. Source: Author’s calculations; Data: Deutsche Bundesbank, time series
database, banks and other financial institutions, investment companies
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Figure 7: Balance Sheet of Insurance Companies and Pension Funds in Germany
Other
Loans
Debt Securities
Cash and Deposits
Equity Securities
Other
Unearned Premiums and
Net Equity of Household in
Equity
and Investment Fund Shares
Life Insurance and
Pension Funds
Reserves for outstanding Claims
Assets Liabilities
Note: Assets (in EUR billions, share of total assets): Investment Fund Shares and Equity Securities (1014,
42%), Cash and Deposits (384, 21%), Debt Securities (384, 16%), Loans (299, 12%), Other (209, 9%);
Liabilities (in EUR billions, share of total liabilities): Equity (361, 15%), Net Equity of Household in Life
Insurance and Pension Funds (1592, 66%), Unearned Premiums and Reserves for outstanding Claims
(296, 12%), Other (90, 3%) Total: EUR 2428 billion. Source: Author’s calculations; Data: Deutsche
Bundesbank, time series database, banks and other financial institutions, insurance corporations and
pension funds.
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Appendix
While most securities have a constant amount outstanding over time, the supply of some
securities can change. The actual amount outstanding can change if the bond is callable or
when for asset-backed securities a part of the amount issued is returned to investors early.
The e↵ective amount outstanding (the tradable amount) of securities can for instance
be altered when securities are bought under asset-purchase programs. While if the total
amount outstanding diminishes, the security is not included in the sample, the security
is included when the amount outstanding is not reduced to zero. In order to make sure
that the changed amount outstanding does not appear as a transaction, I adjust by the
pool-factor.49
The nominal value is
NominalV alue = RawV alue ⇤ e ⇤ Poolfactor (16)
where e is the domestic price of foreign currency. The pool factor adjusts the nominal
value of the specific security by partial or special redemptions. If no redemption has
occurred, the poolfactor is one. It gives the amount that is left to be distributed.
In order to obtain a nominal value that moves only when a security is actually bought
or sold, the nominal value needs to be adjusted by exchange rate changes and the pool
factor.
AdjustedNominalV aluet =
NominalV aluet
Poolfactort
⇤ et 1
et
(17)
et 1
et
  1 is the percentage appreciation of the Euro. If the Euro appreciates and the
foreign currencies depreciate, this reduces the nominal value of securities in Euros if these
securities are denominated in foreign currency and these movements do not reflect buy
decisions. By multiplying by the poolfactor, I adjust for partial or special redemptions. In
the text, I always refer to the adjusted nominal value in order to adjust for the movements
that do not reflect investment decisions. The netbuy variable is obtained by taking the
natural log change of the adjusted nominal value given they trade.
49This changed supply can still have e↵ects that are not captured by the security fixed e↵ects. However,
I can control for this security-specific amount outstanding by including security⇤time fixed e↵ects.
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Table A1: Bond Holdings of German Investors (in %)
Variable Funds ICPF Banks
Government 54.9 53.2 33.1
OFC 7.5 7.3 9.8
NFC 8.3 3.9 1.5
Banks 29.3 35.5 55.5
Euro 84.2 92.2 95.1
USD 11.8 2.4 3.4
Other Currency 4.2 5.6 1.8
Domestic 39.6 39.5 73.6
Foreign 60.7 60.7 26.7
Percentage debt securities holdings of investment funds
(Funds), insurance companies and pension funds (ICPF ) and
Banks issued by the Government, Other-Financial Corpo-
rations (OFC), Non-Financial Corporations (NFC), Banks,
in Euros, US Dollars (USD), other currency and by domes-
tic or foreign residents. Values are averages over the sam-
ple period. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of
the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings
Statistics, 2004 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
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Table A2: German vs. Foreign Bonds
Dependent variable: Netbuy
Funds ICPF Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Price 0.114⇤⇤⇤ 0.142⇤⇤⇤ -0.941⇤⇤⇤ -0.509⇤⇤⇤ 0.383⇤⇤⇤ 0.406⇤⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.027) (0.149) (0.157) (0.103) (0.104)
 Price ⇤ German -0.161⇤ -0.107 0.293 0.279 -0.129 -0.142
(0.088) (0.089) (0.229) (0.239) (0.179) (0.182)
R-squared 0.120 0.126 0.161 0.173 0.112 0.114
Observations 232321 232321 29848 29848 120336 120336
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held.  Price is the change in the log of
the price and is lagged by one quarter. German is a dummy that equals one if the country of issue is Germany
and zero otherwise. Column (1)-(2) estimate the specification for the investment fund sector. Column (3)-(4)
estimate the specification for the insurance companies and pension fund sector. Column (5)-(6) estimate the
specification for the banking sector. Fixed e↵ects are either included (Yes), not included (No) or spanned by
other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the security-level
and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research
Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, 2005 Q4 -
2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
Table A3: Covariance Stockmarket
Dependent variable: Netbuy
Funds ICPF Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Price 0.0850⇤⇤⇤ 0.119⇤⇤⇤ -0.934⇤⇤⇤ -0.519⇤⇤⇤ 0.255⇤⇤⇤ 0.269⇤⇤
(0.033) (0.039) (0.154) (0.160) (0.096) (0.110)
 Price⇤cov Price,Dax 0.0104 0.00887 0.0793 0.0536 0.106⇤ 0.0979⇤
(0.015) (0.017) (0.087) (0.082) (0.056) (0.056)
R-squared 0.120 0.126 0.159 0.171 0.111 0.113
Observations 226614 226614 29432 29432 119032 119032
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held.  Price is the change in the log of the price
and is lagged by one quarter. cov Price,Dax is the covariance of the price change of the security and the percentage change
of the German stockmarket index (Dax). cov Price,Dax is demeaned and standardized by the sample standard deviation.
Column (1)-(2) estimate the specification for the investment fund sector. Column (3)-(4) estimate the specification for
the insurance companies and pension fund sector. Column (5)-(6) estimate the specification for the banking sector. Fixed
e↵ects are either included (Yes), not included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard errors are in parentheses.
Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤
p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase
Securities Holdings Statistics, Bloomberg, Datastream, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
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Table A4:   Risk-free Yield
Dependent variable: Netbuy
Funds ICPF Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Price 0.0964⇤⇤⇤ 0.131⇤⇤⇤ -0.859⇤⇤⇤ -0.442⇤⇤⇤ 0.349⇤⇤⇤ 0.364⇤⇤⇤
(0.027) (0.036) (0.143) (0.152) (0.091) (0.111)
 Price ⇤  rf 0.00803 0.00553 0.162 0.118 -0.0136 -0.00962
(0.020) (0.016) (0.128) (0.107) (0.049) (0.066)
R-squared 0.111 0.117 0.158 0.170 0.106 0.108
Observations 221671 221671 28844 28844 112615 112615
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held.  Price is the change in the log
of the price and is lagged by one quarter.  rf is the coe cient obtained from a regression of the yield of the
security on on the risk-free yield within its maturity bucket.  rf is demeaned and standardized by the sample
standard deviation. Column (1)-(2) estimate the specification for the investment fund sector. Column (3)-
(4) estimate the specification for the insurance companies and pension fund sector. Column (5)-(6) estimate
the specification for the banking sector. Fixed e↵ects are either included (Yes), not included (No) or spanned
by other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard errors are in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at
the security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01.
Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings
Statistics, Bloomberg, Datastream, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
Table A5: Covariance Risk-free Yield
Dependent variable: Netbuy
Funds ICPF Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Price 0.0991⇤⇤⇤ 0.133⇤⇤⇤ -0.894⇤⇤⇤ -0.488⇤⇤⇤ 0.346⇤⇤⇤ 0.364⇤⇤⇤
(0.025) (0.034) (0.165) (0.138) (0.122) (0.101)
 Price⇤covyield,rf -0.0263 -0.0396⇤⇤ 0.0643 0.0723 0.00779 0.0168
(0.024) (0.018) (0.106) (0.125) (0.057) (0.054)
R-squared 0.113 0.119 0.159 0.171 0.106 0.108
Observations 217641 217641 28829 28829 112092 112092
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held.  Price is the change in the log of the
price and is lagged by one quarter. covyield,rf is the covariance of the yield of the security and the risk-free yield
within its maturity bucket. covyield,rf is demeaned and standardized by the sample standard deviation. Column
(1)-(2) estimate the specification for the investment fund sector. Column (3)-(4) estimate the specification for the
insurance companies and pension fund sector. Column (5)-(6) estimate the specification for the banking sector.
Fixed e↵ects are either included (Yes), not included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard errors are
in parentheses. Bootstrapped standard errors are clustered at the security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, Bloomberg, Datastream, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s
calculations.
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Table A6: Volatility
Dependent variable: Netbuy
Funds ICPF Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Price 0.109⇤⇤⇤ 0.153⇤⇤⇤ -0.928⇤⇤⇤ -0.363 0.539⇤⇤⇤ 0.594⇤⇤⇤
(0.035) (0.040) (0.174) (0.233) (0.126) (0.137)
 Price ⇤ vol -0.00240 -0.00925 0.0600 -0.0414 -0.121⇤⇤ -0.130⇤⇤
(0.018) (0.017) (0.090) (0.099) (0.057) (0.058)
R-squared 0.120 0.126 0.161 0.173 0.112 0.114
Observations 232321 232321 29848 29848 120336 120336
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held.  Price is the change in the
log of the price and is lagged by one quarter. vol is the standard deviation of  Price. vol is demeaned and
standardized by the sample standard deviation. Column (1)-(2) estimate the specification for the investment
fund sector. Column (3)-(4) estimate the specification for the insurance companies and pension fund sector.
Column (5)-(6) estimate the specification for the banking sector. Fixed e↵ects are either included (Yes),
not included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard errors are in parentheses. Bootstrapped
standard errors are clustered at the security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤
p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
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Table A7: VIX
Dependent variable: Netbuy
Funds ICPF Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Price 0.0719⇤⇤⇤ 0.133⇤⇤⇤ -1.003⇤⇤⇤ -0.463⇤⇤⇤ 0.328⇤⇤⇤ 0.346⇤⇤⇤
(0.027) (0.031) (0.127) (0.146) (0.096) (0.102)
VIX 0.00492 0.0464⇤⇤⇤ -0.00293
(0.003) (0.012) (0.007)
 Price ⇤ VIX 0.140⇤⇤ 0.00936 0.623⇤⇤ 0.207 0.0888 0.0856
(0.056) (0.060) (0.282) (0.347) (0.202) (0.214)
R-squared 0.120 0.126 0.162 0.173 0.112 0.114
Observations 232041 232041 29848 29848 120283 120283
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held.  Price is the change in the
log of the price and is lagged by one quarter. VIX is the log of the implied volatility for S&P 500 stock
options and demeaned by the sample average. Column (1)-(2) estimate the specification for the investment
fund sector. Column (3)-(4) estimate the specification for the insurance companies and pension fund sector.
Column (5)-(6) estimate the specification for the banking sector. Fixed e↵ects are either included (Yes), not
included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered at the security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase
Securities Holdings Statistics, Datastream, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
Table A8: Crisis Split for Funds
Dependent variable: Netbuy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Price 0.131⇤ 0.0540 0.109⇤⇤⇤ 0.106⇤⇤⇤ 0.0946⇤ 0.172⇤⇤⇤
(0.078) (0.085) (0.029) (0.032) (0.054) (0.064)
R-squared 0.190 0.196 0.164 0.168 0.183 0.191
Observations 42186 42186 99962 99962 86831 86831
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Period Pre-Crisis Pre-Crisis Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis Post-Crisis
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held for investment funds.  Price is the
change in the log of the price and is lagged by one quarter. Pre-Crisis refers to the period 2006 Q1:2008 Q1,
Crisis refers to 2008 Q2:2012 Q3 and Post-crisis refers to 2012 Q4:2014 Q4. Fixed e↵ects are either included
(Yes), not included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors
are clustered at the security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05,⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities
Holdings Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
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Table A9: Crisis Split for ICPF
Dependent variable: Netbuy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Price -3.383⇤⇤⇤ -2.335⇤⇤⇤ -0.502⇤⇤⇤ -0.168 -0.466⇤ -0.531⇤
(0.486) (0.573) (0.155) (0.180) (0.252) (0.296)
R-squared 0.258 0.268 0.181 0.194 0.235 0.246
Observations 7776 7776 13225 13225 7877 7877
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Period Pre-Crisis Pre-Crisis Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis Post-Crisis
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held for insurance companies and pension
funds.  Price is the change in the log of the price and is lagged by one quarter. Pre-Crisis refers to the period
2006 Q1:2008 Q1, Crisis refers to 2008 Q2:2012 Q3 and Post-crisis refers to 2012 Q4:2014 Q4. Fixed e↵ects are
either included (Yes), not included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard errors are in parentheses.
Standard errors are clustered at the security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1,⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase
Securities Holdings Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
Table A10: Crisis Split for Banks
Dependent variable: Netbuy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Price 0.615⇤⇤ 0.664⇤⇤ 0.256⇤⇤ 0.302⇤⇤⇤ 0.761⇤⇤⇤ 0.569⇤⇤
(0.282) (0.297) (0.104) (0.110) (0.250) (0.267)
R-squared 0.146 0.147 0.151 0.153 0.167 0.170
Observations 30665 30665 53165 53165 33314 33314
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Period Pre-Crisis Pre-Crisis Crisis Crisis Post-Crisis Post-Crisis
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held for banks.  Price is the change in
the log of the price and is lagged by one quarter. Pre-Crisis refers to the period 2006 Q1:2008 Q1, Crisis refers to
2008 Q2:2012 Q3 and Post-crisis refers to 2012 Q4:2014 Q4. Fixed e↵ects are either included (Yes), not included
(No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the
security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source:
Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, 2005
Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
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Table A11: Buy and Sell
Funds ICPF Banks
Dependent variable: Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Price 1.592⇤⇤⇤ -0.524⇤⇤ -0.865⇤ 4.235⇤⇤⇤ 1.825⇤⇤⇤ -1.232⇤⇤⇤
(0.237) (0.247) (0.443) (0.402) (0.270) (0.280)
R-squared 0.238 0.272 0.254 0.286 0.378 0.338
Observations 333827 336908 116917 119234 405185 408853
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
The dependent variable Buy is the log of the nominal amount bought. The dependent variable Sell is the log of
the nominal amount sold.  Price is the change in the log of the price and is lagged by one quarter. Column
(1)-(2) estimate the specification for the investment fund sector. Column (3)-(4) estimate the specification for the
insurance companies and pension fund sector. Column (5)-(6) estimate the specification for the banking sector
sector. Fixed e↵ects are either included (Yes), not included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard
errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche
Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
Table A12: Issuer Sector Heterogeneity
Dependent variable: Netbuy
Funds ICPF Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Price 0.121⇤⇤⇤ 0.137⇤⇤⇤ -3.096⇤⇤⇤ -2.712⇤⇤⇤ 0.875⇤⇤⇤ 0.828⇤⇤⇤
(0.037) (0.039) (0.682) (0.662) (0.276) (0.276)
 Price⇤ gov -0.146⇤⇤ -0.124⇤ 2.442⇤⇤⇤ 2.437⇤⇤⇤ -0.770⇤⇤ -0.650⇤⇤
(0.069) (0.070) (0.698) (0.673) (0.310) (0.309)
 Price ⇤ banks 0.0844 0.123⇤ 2.406⇤⇤⇤ 2.653⇤⇤⇤ -0.468 -0.446
(0.069) (0.071) (0.718) (0.695) (0.300) (0.299)
 Price ⇤ ofc -0.0379 -0.0122 2.196⇤⇤⇤ 2.246⇤⇤⇤ -0.293 -0.267
(0.062) (0.063) (0.748) (0.719) (0.357) (0.357)
R-squared 0.121 0.127 0.161 0.173 0.113 0.115
Observations 226726 226726 29556 29556 119033 119033
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held.  Price is the change in the
log of the price and is lagged by one quarter. gov is a dummy that equals one if the security is a government
bond and zero otherwise. banks is a dummy that equals one if the security is a bank bond and zero
otherwise. ofc is a dummy that equals one if the security is a bond issued by an other-financial institution
and zero otherwise. The level coe cient reflects the response to non-financial corporate bonds. Column
(1)-(2) estimate the specification for the investment fund sector. Column (3)-(4) estimate the specification
for the insurance companies and pension fund sector. Column (5)-(6) estimate the specification for the
banking sector. Fixed e↵ects are either included (Yes), not included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects
(-). Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the security-level and robust to
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and
Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014
Q4; author’s calculations.
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Table A13: Summary Table
Dependent variable: Netbuy
(1) (2) (3)
Specification Funds ICPF Banks
(1) No Controls 0.156⇤⇤⇤ -0.461⇤⇤⇤ 0.343⇤⇤⇤
(0.021) (0.113) (0.070)
(2) Security FE 0.106⇤⇤⇤ -0.900⇤⇤⇤ 0.351⇤⇤⇤
(0.024) (0.115) (0.085)
(3) Macro Controls 0.140⇤⇤⇤ -0.792⇤⇤⇤ 0.368⇤⇤⇤
(0.024) (0.116) (0.085)
(4) Country Controls 0.172⇤⇤⇤ -0.828⇤⇤⇤ 0.366⇤⇤⇤
(0.024) (0.121) (0.087)
(5) Country⇤Time FE 0.126⇤⇤⇤ -0.480⇤⇤⇤ 0.345⇤⇤⇤
(0.028) (0.155) (0.095)
(6) Country⇤Sector⇤Time FE 0.155⇤⇤⇤ -0.341⇤⇤ 0.387⇤⇤⇤
(0.029) (0.167) (0.098)
(7) Sample of securities held by all 0.105⇤⇤⇤ -0.850⇤⇤⇤ 0.341⇤⇤⇤
(0.024) (0.116) (0.084)
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held. The coe cients
are the estimated e↵ect of  Price.  Price is the change in the log of the price and is lagged
by one quarter. For each sector the number of observations are the same in specifications
(1)-(6). Macro Controls include German GDP growth, inflation, the 10-year government
bond yield for Germany and the EONIA as well as the VIX. Country Controls include
country-specific GDP growth, inflation, the 10-year government bond yield for Germany
and the EONIA as well as the VIX. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors
are clustered at the security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤
p < 0.1, ⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the
Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, IMF, ECB, 2005 Q4 -
2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
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Table A14: Broad and Relative Price Changes
Dependent variable: Netbuy
Funds ICPF Banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 Pricebroad -0.0142 0.0180 -1.125⇤⇤⇤ -0.463⇤ 0.423⇤⇤⇤ 0.537⇤⇤⇤
(0.038) (0.050) (0.208) (0.243) (0.136) (0.154)
 Pricerelative 0.127⇤⇤⇤ 0.132⇤⇤⇤ -0.464⇤⇤⇤ -0.269⇤ 0.342⇤⇤⇤ 0.349⇤⇤⇤
(0.028) (0.029) (0.148) (0.152) (0.096) (0.097)
R-squared 0.116 0.122 0.162 0.173 0.109 0.111
Observations 207761 207761 27449 27449 108468 108468
Security FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
The dependent variable is the change in the log of the nominal amount held.  Pricebroad is the price
change of the index for the issuing sector in the specific country.  Pricerelative is the deviation of the
security-specific price change from the price change of the country-issuing sector index. All independent
variables are lagged by one quarter. Column (1)-(2) estimate the specification for the investment fund
sector. Column (3)-(4) estimate the specification for the insurance companies and pension fund sector.
Column (5)-(6) estimate the specification for the banking sector. Fixed e↵ects are either included (Yes),
not included (No) or spanned by other fixed e↵ects (-). Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered at the security-level and robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. ⇤ p < 0.1,⇤⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.01. Source: Research Data and Service Centre of the Deutsche Bundesbank,
Microdatabase Securities Holdings Statistics, 2005 Q4 - 2014 Q4; author’s calculations.
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